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JURISDICTION
The authority believed

to confer

jurisdiction

on the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from a
recommendation of discipline by the Board of Bar Commissioners
(the "Board") of the Utah State Bar (the "Bar") is Article VIII,
Section

3

of

the

Utah

Constitution

and

Utah

Code

Ann,

S 78-2-2(3)(c) (1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following

issues are presented for review in this

case:
1.
the

Bar's

disciplinary

recommendation
disbarred

Whether many of the factual
hearing

panel

(the

findings upon which
"Panel") based

that appellant, J. Richard Calder

exceeded

the

express

or

implied

its

("Calder") be

scope

of

conduct

outlined by the Bar's two complaints against Calder.
2.

Whether

in investigating

and deciding one of the

two disciplinary complaints, the Panel misapprehended applicable
substantive law, thereby inducing it to enter a number of clearly
- erroneous factual findings.
3.

Whether many of the findings of fact upon which

the Panel concluded that Calder should be disbarred were either
not established with the clear and convincing evidence required
by

Rule

XII(c)

of

the

Bar's

Procedures

of

Discipline

(the

"Procedures") and/or are so clearly erroneous as to require that
they be overturned.
4.

Whether the Panel improperly failed to consider

several mitigating factors in electing to recommend the draconian
remedy of disbarment.
5.

Whether

the recommendation

of disbarment

is so

completely disproportionate to the conduct found by the Panel to
constitute ethical violations as to be arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES
There

are

no

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is believed
to be solely determinative of the outcome of this case. However,
many provisions of the Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct and
the Procedures are relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(1) Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Panel and the Board.

This is a disciplinary proceed-

ing instituted by the Bar's counsel pursuant to Rule VIII(e) of
the Procedures.

After its formal complaints (the "Complaints")

were consolidated, the Panel conducted an evidentiary hearing
both on the Complaints and on issues not raised by the Complaints.

On February 16, 1989, the Panel made and entered its
-2-

Findings

of

Factf

(the

"Findings")

Conclusions

of

Law

(the

"Conclusions") and Recommendation of Discipline (the "Recommendation") which were adopted by the Board on March 24, 1989.

(See

App. i). Calder timely objected to the Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendation.

(R. 141-55).

After considering the objections,

a three member hearing panel of the Board perfunctorily denied
them

by order

dated May

24, 1989.

(R. 195-6).

It

is that

determination, together with the underlying Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendations, from which this appeal is taken.
A.

Procedural Background.

Calder has been licensed to practice law in the State
of Utah since August, 1974.

(Tr. 275). 1

Since 1981, Calder's

primary area of practice has been bankruptcy.
serviced

approximately

700

to

800

bankruptcy

(Tr. 279.)
cases

per

He
year

during 1985, 1986 and 1987, s^e Tr. 283-85, and a substantial
number of additional bankruptcy cases before 1985.

(Tr. 279).

Of the several thousand clients Calder represented between 1974
and the present, only two of them —

1

Larry Bailey ("Bailey") and

All references to the trial transcript will be to the original
page number assigned by the reporter, and not to the pagination
scheme employed by the Bar.
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Dennis Job

("Job") —
2
with the Bar*
The Bar's

filed written

formal

complaint

filed on October 23, 1987.
App. ii).

complaints

App. iii).

Calder

in the Bailey matter

was

(Trial Ex. B-l attached hereto as

The Bar's formal amended complaint

was filed on June 2 f

against

in the Job matter

1987. (Trial Ex. B-27 attached hereto as

Neither of the Complaints made any mention of the

Bar's intent to scrutinize Calder's conduct for any period after
1986.

LdL
B.

Bailey Complaint and Disposition.

Bailey

retained

Calder

bankruptcy petition for him.

in 1978

(Tr. 28).

to

file

a Chapter

7

Bailey claimed, and the

Panel so found, that Bailey informed Calder of the existence of a
judgment

in the amount of $1,400.00 arising from an automobile

accident in which Bailey was involved; that Calder inadvertently

2

While it is true that in 1983 a clerk of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah referred to the Bar 20
separate alleged deficiencies that the clerk discerned in
Calder1s representation of clients, the Bar's investigation was
concluded by a private reprimand. Notably, none of those clients
ever made any complaint to the Bar regarding any aspect of
Calder1s representation of their interests. The private reprimand, obviously, is relevant only to the issue of the sanction,
if any, to be imposed against Calder. It is not relevant to the
issue of whether Calder breached any of the ethical and professional obligations alleged by the Bar's Complaints in his representation of Messers. Bailey and Job.

-4-

failed to list the judgment on Bailey's bankruptcy schedule; that
as ^a result of that omission, Bailey was precluded from obtaining
a

Utah

driver's

license

necessary

for

his

employment

as

an

erstwhile truck driver; and, that as a result of that omission,
Bailey was unable to obtain employment for an unspecified period
of time.

(Findings Nos. 1(a) and (p); R. 121, 151).
The "evidence" supporting the finding that the omission

of

the

judgment

debt

precluded

Bailey

from

obtaining

a Utah

driver's license consists solely of hearsay i.e., what an unspecified representative

of

the Utah Department

of Motor

Vehicles

allegedly told Bailey the consequences of his failure to have the
judgment

satisfied or discharged would be.

The record
official

(See Tr. 35, 76).

is devoid of any copy of the alleged judgment, any

records

maintained

by

the

Utah

Department

of

Motor

Vehicles even hinting at the existence of the alleged judgment,
or any proof that during 1979 (the year in which Bailey claimed
he was denied a new driver's license) Utah law provided that a
judgment

debtor's discharge

in bankruptcy
3
issuance of a renewed license.

could

facilitate the

3 Indeed, as demonstrated in Argument II infra, Utah law in 1979
provided just the opposite.
Utah Code Ann., S 41-12-15 (1979)
provided in pertinent part that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the
judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this act."

-5-

In 1983, Bailey complained to the Bar about Calder's
omission of the alleged judgment.
the Bar's screening

His complaint was dismissed by

panel which determined

that

".

. . the

complaint was not timely filed . . and, therefore, determined
that it would be dismissed for that reason."

(Tr. 122),

After

that determination was made, however, Calder unilaterally volunteered (with no pressure from the Bar's counsel or the Board) to
". . . proceed with amending the schedules and getting the matter
taken care of."

Id.

Based on his then-existing understanding that effecting
an amendment

to Bailey1s

bankruptcy

schedules was a simple,

ministerial task for which the bankruptcy court would charge only
a

$10.00

amendment

fee, Calder

through Bailey's payment

agreed

of that

fee.

to solve

the problem

(Tr. 123).

However,

unbeknownst to Calder, Bailey's bankruptcy case had been closed
by the court and the files had been shipped to a central filing
office in Denver, Colorado.

(Tr. 329).

reopen the case would be $50.00.

The additional fee to

(Id.; Trial Exs. B-15 and

B-16).
During

his

telephone

conversations

with

the

Bar's

counsel, Jeffery C. Paoletti, Calder expressly stated his position that he was entitled to payment of an additional attorney's
fee to cover the ". . . additional work that he was doing."

-6-

(Tr.

125).

While

" . . .

the

resolution

at

the end of

that

conversation was that [Calder] was to take an additional $15.00,"
the issue of the additional attorney's fees quoted by Calder was
unresolved

inasmuch as Paoletti understood that Calder was not

prepared to waive any of his attorney's fees to solve the problem.

Id.

writing

Unfortunately, Paoletti never provided Calder with any

memorializing

his

perception

of

Calder's

voluntarily

assumed commitment to amend Bailey's bankruptcy schedules.

(Tr.

137, 138). 4
In Finding No. K g ) , the Panel found that:
Though [Calder] presented conflicting evidence
as
to
the
agreement,
the
Panel
accepted [Paoletti's] testimony as the most
credible evidence of [Calder's] agreement to
represent Mr. Bailey in amending his Bankruptcy. "
However, Paoletti himself
that

" . . .

events."

I don't

have

frankly acknowledged
a clear

in his testimony

recollection

of all of the

(Tr. 121).
In any event, by letter dated December 16, 1983, Calder

informed
amendment

Bailey

that

Calder's

would be $120.00 —

net

charges

for

effecting

the

$70.00 for attorney's fees and

4

Paoletti's confirming letter was sent only to Bailey. (Trial
Ex. B-12).

-7-

$50.00 for filing fees. (Trial Ex. B-16).

As noted above, Bailey

paid only $15.00 of the quoted charges.

(Tr. 51).

1984,

In January,

Calder filed a motion to reopen Bailey's bankruptcy pro-

ceeding

so

that

the

(Trial Ex. B-18).

purported

judgment

could

be

discharged.

Calder admitted that the motion was incomplete

and would need to be supplemented.

(Tr. 530). However, because

Bailey refused to pay any more than $15.00 of the charges quoted
by

Calder,

Calder

refrained

motion to reopen.
bankruptcy court sua

from

noticing

(Tr. 330, 529).

up for hearing

the

On February 15, 1984, the

sponte denied the motion without prejudice.

(Trial Ex. B-19).

Its order explicitly stated that the motion
5
could be later renewed. Id.
Upon learning of the court's action, Bailey
Calder's

office

accordingly

staff.

informed

(Trial

Bailey

by

Ex.

B-20; Tr.

letter dated

that he should find new counsel.

berated

356).

February

(Trial Ex. B-20).

Calder
16, 1984

With that

letter, Calder enclosed the entire contents of Bailey's file and
a check

in the amount

of

$15.00 as a voluntary

monies Bailey had previously paid.

5

refund of the

Id.

Indeed, two months later, Bailey hired new counsel who did
just that and succeeded in having the allegedly omitted judgment
lien discharged. (Trial Ex. B-22; Tr. 101).

-8-

In its Findings, the Panel cast

these events

following terms:
[l]b. In or about October 1983, [Calder]
entered into an engagement with Mr. Bailey,
arranged through Bar
Counsel,
C. Jeffrey
Paoletti, to resolve an investigation of a
disciplinary complaint filed by Mr. Bailey
against
[Calder].
By
this
engagement,
[Calder] agreed that he would obtain an
amendment to Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy schedules and obtain a discharge for Mr. Bailey of
a judgment debt owed by Mr. Bailey to Richard
D. and Morren C. Harris in the sum of about
$1,400.00.
c.
[Calder] agreed to complete the
engagement and achieve the objective upon Mr.
Bailey's
paying
$10.00
for
additional
attorney's fees; Mr. Bailey made said payment
of $10.00 to [Calder].
d.
After accepting the engagement and
agreeing upon the fee to be charged, [Calder]
demanded additional money from Mr. Bailey, in
the amount of $120.00, in order to initiate
the engagement.
Mr. Bailey complained to
Mr. Paelotti [sic] about this additional fee.
e.
Subsequent to the October 1983
engagement,
numerous
communications
were
exchanged between Mr. Bailey and [Calder],
and between [Calder] and Bar Counsel which
concluded
with
[Calder] reaffirming
his
agreement to continue representing Mr. Bailey
in amending the bankruptcy schedules.
Mr.
Bailey paid an additional $15.00 to [Calder],
at [Calder]fs request, in furtherance of the
engagement.
f.
After reaffirming the engagement,
[Calder] filed documents with the Bankruptcy
Court on behalf of Mr. Bailey as Mr. Bailey's
counsel.

-9-

in the

g.
Though [Calder] presented conflicting evidence as to the agreement, the Panel
accepted
former
Bar Counsel
C. Jeffrey
Paelotti's
[sic] testimony
as the most
credible evidence of [Calder]fs agreement to
represent Mr. Bailey in amending his Bankruptcy.
h.
[Calder] filed a Motion to Reopen
Mr.
Bailey1s case, but the Motion was
inadequate on its face.
i.
After filing the Motion with the
Bankruptcy Court, [Calder] failed to follow
through with his representation of Mr. Bailey
by failing to schedule the Motion to Reopen
for hearing and by failing to present the
Motion to the judge for consideration.
j.
The Motion to reopen was denied,
and, immediately upon learning of the Courtfs
order, [Calder] withdrew from representing
Mr. Bailey.
At no time after February 16,
1984, did [Calder] make any effort to obtain
substitute counsel for Bailey, return the
$10.00 paid by Bailey, refund any portion of
the original attorney's fees and costs paid
by Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps
with the Department of Motor Vehicles to
assist Bailey obtain a driver's license or,
in any other way, assist Bailey in achieving
the desired objective."
A year later, in 1985, Bailey filed a civil complaint
against

Calder

for malpractice.

That

complaint

was

with prejudice at the conclusion of Bailey's case
trial.

(Tr.

7).

Before

Bailey's

complaint

was

dismissed

in chief at
dismissed,

however, Calder prepared, signed and filed an affidavit
malpractice case.

(Trial

Ex.

B-26).

-10-

in the

Calder admitted at the

bar trial that several of the statements in the affidavit were
false.

He insisted, however, that the misstatements were inad-

vertent.

(Tr. 337-39, 355,

483,

No. l(k), determined that the
and intentionally."
C.

531). The Panel, in Finding

misstatements were made "knowingly

(R. 123-4).

Job Complaint and Disposition.

In representing Job, Calder omitted

from Job's bank-

ruptcy schedules the existence of a lawsuit in which Job had an
interest.

(Finding No. 2(b); R. 151-2).

The suit was entitled

Job, et al. v. Pocklington, et al.. United States District Court
for the District of Utah, Civil No. C82-1085C (the "Pocklington
Case").

Calder readily admits that he did not "take reasonable

steps and precautions to ensure that this

cause of action was

properly scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 case."
No.

2(b); R.

151-2).

He does, however, deny

that

(Finding
Job

ever

mentioned that the Pocklington Case had in fact been filed; that
he was

ever

Pocklington

informed
Case;

that

of

the amount

he

was

ever

of damages
provided

sought

with

any

in the
papers

generated in the Pocklington Case; or, that he was ever informed
of the identity of any counsel
196, 199, 200).
about

in the Pocklington Case.

(Tr.

Indeed, the only information Job gave to Calder

the Pocklington

case was that

-11-

it was a "possible claim

against Pacific Coast League for defamation of Peter Pocklington,
value undetermined."

(Tr. 196f 406).

Several months after filing the Chapter 7 petition for
Jobf Calder suggested and Job agreed that a Chapter 13 petition
be filed on the heels of the Chapter 7 for the dual purposes of
administering and preserving the Pocklington Case and forestalling Job's mortgage lender from foreclosing its mortgage against
Job's home.

(Tr. 151- 52).

After the Chapter 13 petition was

filed, Job failed to attend the first meeting of creditors.
235, 504).

(Tr.

Both Calder and his secretary testified that before

the meeting Calder repeatedly and heatedly urged Job to be in
attendance.

(Tr. 506, 703).

When Job failed to do so, Calder

filed with the bankruptcy court a motion for leave to withdraw as
Job's counsel.

(Tr. 238-39, 432). Job received a copy of that

motion shortly after it was mailed on July 3, 1984.
238-39).
month

Court hearing on the motion was conducted more than one

later

granted.

(Tr. 160,

on August

(Tr. 239).

6, 1984, at which

time the motion

was

In the face of those facts, however, the

Bar found that:
"[Calder] withdrew from representing Mr. Job
in July, 1984, without Mr. Job's consent or
knowledge.
At the time of his
withdrawal
[Calder] knew that it would be difficult for
Mr. Job to obtain substitute counsel to
resist the Chapter 13 trustee's pending
motion for dismissal." (Finding No. 2(e)).
-12-

At

a

hearing

on

August

8r

1984, Job's

Chapter

13

petition was dismissed and his previous Chapter 7 discharge was
revoked, with the result that Job admittedly did not obtain any
final relief

in bankruptcy.

(Finding

No. 2(g)).

However,

according to Bankruptcy Judge, Judith A. Boulden, Job consented
to that action:

the court

inquired " . . .

wanted done and he [Job] said 'yes'.n

if that's what he

(Tr. 634).

Job subsequently sought to retain new counsel to file a
Chapter 11 petition to forestall an impending trustee's sale on
his

house.

(Tr. 169).

After

engaging

new

counsel, he was

informed by that counsel on the very morning of the sale that
counsel would not file the Chapter 11 petition unless and until
certain additional attorney's fees were paid. Id.
to timely pay the required fees.

Id.

Job was unable

As a result, his Chapter

11 petition was filed several minutes after the trustee's sale
was conducted.

(Tr. 169-70).

There is no evidence that Job's

successor counsel ever sought to vacate the trustee's sale as a
violation of the automatic stay by arguing that the filing of his
Chapter

11 petition

occurred

before

the

trustee's

deed

was

delivered.
In September,
against Calder.

1984, Job filed

(Finding No. 2(i)).

filed and was operating

a malpractice

action

Although Calder had already

under his own Chapter 13 plan, Calder
-13-

neglected

to

list

However, according

Job

as

a creditor.

(Finding

No.

2(j)).

to Calder, that failure was attributable

to

his misapprehension that Job's claim constituted a post-petition
debt which could not be discharged in bankruptcy.
512, 779-81).

(Tr. 442-45f

Accordingly, Calder refrained from informing the

state court of the imposition of the automatic stay until February, 1986.

Id.

On July 16, 1985, Calder filed a motion to reopen Job's
Chapter 11 proceeding.

(Finding

mined

was

that

the

motion

No.

filed

harass, injure and annoy Mr. Job."

2(k)).

"solely
Id.

The Panel deter-

with

the

intent

to

That finding, however,

ignores any mention of the justification advanced by Calder for
the filing of the affidavit:

to discharge his obligation as an

officer of the court to inform the court that false or otherwise
improper disclosures were being made by a
protection.

debtor seeking

its

(Tr. 450).

On July 18, 1985, Calder filed an affidavit
state court case.

(Finding No. 2(m)).

in Job's

In that affidavit, Calder

set forth possible explanations that he had for the omission of
the Pocklington Case as an asset on Job's bankruptcy schedules.
Those

explanations

were

factual basis and " . . .
which pervades

found

by

the

Panel

to be

lacking

in

indicative of an attitude of bad faith

[Calder1s] conduct
-14-

in connection with

the Utah

State Bar disciplinary proceedings and the court proceedings."
(Finding No. 2(n)).
D.

Calder Bankruptcy Petitions.

Just before the court entered a judgment against Calder
fl

in Job's state court action, Calder transferred an allegedly
• substantial portion of his property to his wife
(Finding No. 2(o)).

. .

and brother."

Calder testified that the purpose for the

transfers was two-fold:

to designate his wife as a joint tenant

with rights of survivorship for estate planning purposes and to
secure a loan obligation that he had just incurred to his brother
in the amount of $40f000.00 to pay the IRS for back taxes.
512-16, 544, 755-57).

(Tr.

In addition, a review of Calder's bank-

ruptcy schedules discloses that the value of assets transferred
to his wife was

insubstantial.

B-33; Tr. 605, 389-402).

(Compare Trial Exs. B-32 and

The validity

and

legality of

those

transfers are ". . . the subject of pending adversary proceedings" by Calder's Chapter 7 trustee.
sis added).

(Finding No. 2(o)) (Empha-

According to the trustee, those proceedings have not

yet been resolved.

(Tr. 565).

One of Calder's Chapter 13 petitions was dismissed in
1986 on the basis that it was filed in bad faith.
3).

The

Panel

determined

that

Calder's

intent

(Finding No.
in

filing

the

Chapter 13 was ". . . t o frustrate the claims of Job and Bailey."
-15-

Id.

In determining

that

intent,

however,

the

Panel

ignored

Calder's explanation that his purpose for filing the 1984 petition was to save his house from an IRS sale and his purpose for
filing

the

1986

petition

practice from being

was

to

keep

the

assets

levied upon and dismembered

of

his

law

by Job to the

ultimate detriment of both Calder and his other creditors.

In

addition, that finding fails to reflect that in November, 1988,
Calder posted a cash supersedeas bond in the amount of $55,000.00
to fully satisfy Job's judgment (Tr. 790, 793-94).
to reflect

that

Bailey's state court

prejudice, no cause of action.

It also fails

claim was dismissed with

(Tr. 7 ) .

When Calder filed the statement of affairs in his 1986
Chapter 7 case, he utilized a pre-printed form statement for a
debtor "not engaged
engaged in business.

in business," despite the fact that he was
(Finding No. 4 ) . However, Calder1s trustee

in bankruptcy acknowledged that he (the trustee) was not prejudiced or confused in any way by Calderfs use of the technically
incorrect

form since

the substance

of

both forms was substantially identical.

required disclosures

on

(Tr. 598).

The Panel determined that Calder failed to fully and
accurately

disclose

assets

on

schedules.

(Finding No. 5).

identifying

which ones and what

his

1986

Chapter

7

bankruptcy

It held that the assets —
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they were worth —

without

listed on

those schedules were

"substantially less" than those listed in

either of Calder1s 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules.
of those schedules, however, belies this finding.
Exs. B-30f

B-31, B-32 and B-33).

A review
(See Trial

The finding also ignores the

fact that many of the so-called discrepancies were attributable
to Calder1s wife's interests being reflected on the 1984 filing
and only his interests being reflected on the 1986 filing.

(Tr.

394,515).
Despite

the

fact

that

the Bar's

Complaints

made

no

mention of the Bar's intent to impose sanctions against Calder
for the bankruptcy court's denial of a general discharge in his
own Chapter 7 case, and despite Calder's objection to the Panel's
consideration of that issue, Tr. 179-83, the Panel made a specific finding that " . . . Calder's failure to list certain assets
in

his

Chapter

fraudulently'"

7

bankruptcy

(Finding No. 6 ) .

was

done

'knowingly

and

It is unclear what effect the

Panel's unanticipated injection of this issue at trial had on its
recommendation of disbarment.

6

Because the "undisclosed assets" consisted of two bank
accounts having a balance of no more than $5.00 and an undefined
and completely worthless interest in an unspecified mineral
claim, Calder has recently appealed this order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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In similar fashion, the Panel made a specific finding
—
—

although it never made the allegation in any of the Complaints
that

Calder was

denied

the absolute

right

to

convert

Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 case "in order to prevent
abuse of the bankruptcy process."

his
[an]

(Finding No. 7 ) . That finding

is devoid of any mention that Calder has timely appealed that
decision to the federal court.
Based on the Findings, the Panel concluded that Calder
breached

several

disbarred.

disciplinary

rules

for

which

he

should

be

(Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Complaint

in the Bailey case was confined to

the 1983 to 1985 time frame and the Complaint in the Job case was
confined

to the 1983

to 1986 time

frame.

Although both

Com-

plaints focused only on Calderfs failure to adequately protect
his clients' interests, and neither gave any hint of the Bar's
intent to challenge the sufficiency of Calder's disclosure to the
bankruptcy court in connection with his own personal bankruptcy
filings, the Bar allowed the admission of substantial evidence on
this issue.

Its decision to do so unfairly prejudiced Calder in

his ability to understand, respond to and rebut the only evidence
that the Panel could find to support its finding of "dishonesty
and fraud."
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2.

In

deciding

the

Bailey

Complaint,

the

Panel

completely misapprehended the 1979 version of Section 41-12-15 of
the Utah Motor Vehicle Act.
to

issue a series of

By doing sof the Panel was induced

clearly

erroneous

factual

findings based on its mistaken view of the law.

findings

—

Each of these

findings must be vacated.
3.
of

Because it is the sole and ultimate responsibility

the Supreme Court

to

impose discipline on

lawyers,

this

responsibility cannot be delegated unqualifiedly to the Bar.

As

such, the Bar's Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation

are

advisory in nature and are entitled to little of the deference
customarily

accorded

lower

court determinations.

Under

this

standard of review, few of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations can be sustained.
4.

Many of the Findings of fact upon which the Panel

concluded that Calder should be disbarred were either not established by clear and convincing evidence and/or are so clearly
erroneous as to require that they be vacated.

If any of the

Findings are so vacated, the resulting Conclusions and Recommendation cannot stand and must be reversed.
5.

The Panel improperly failed to consider or find

any mitigating factors during the penalty phase of the proceeding.

Had it properly applied the applicable ABA Standards for
-19-

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the severity of the proposed Recommendation would have been considerably reduced.

Accordingly, the

case should be remanded to the Panel with instructions to reconsider the Recommendation in light of these mitigating factors.
6.

In light of the extraordinary extent to which (i)

neither the findings nor the Recommendation conform to the Bar's
Complaints, (ii) the Findings are unsupported by the evidence and
(iii) the Recommendation exceeds the scope of the Findings, the
Panel's recommendation of disbarment is so flawed as to render
the Panel's action arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.

On

that basis, the Findings and Conclusions must be vacated and the
Recommendation rejected.
ARGUMENT I
THE
PANEL
IMPROPERLY
AND
PREJUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED ISSUES FAR BEYOND THE EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED SCOPE OF ITS COMPLAINTS AGAINST
CALDER.
A careful review of the Bar's formal Complaints in the
Bailey and Job proceedings, see App. ii and iii infra, discloses
that the conduct to be scrutinized by the Panel in the Bailey
case was confined to the 1983 to 1985 time frame and the conduct
to be scrutinized in the Job case was confined to the 1983 to
1986 time frame.

Both Complaints focus only on Calder's failure

to adequately protect his clients' interests.
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Neither Complaint

offers

any

real

clue

that

the Bar

intended

to challenge

the

sufficiency of Calderfs disclosures to the bankruptcy court in
connection with his own personal bankruptcy filings.
At trial, however, the Bar allowed

its own appointed

prosecutor to introduce a multitude of such evidence.
cally,

Specifi-

it allowed the introduction of the bankruptcy schedules

and statements
bankruptcies.

of

affairs

which Calder

filed

in his personal

(See Trial Exs. B-30, B-31, B-32, B-33).

It also

allowed, over Calder1s objection, see Tr. 179-83, the introduction of a memorandum decision and order dated September 27, 1988,
in which the bankruptcy court denied Calder a general discharge
in bankruptcy for his supposedly knowing and fraudulent omission
of certain assets from his bankruptcy schedules.
B-39).
order

(See Trial Ex.

In addition, the Panel allowed the introduction of an
dated November

18, 1988,

in which

the bankruptcy

court

denied Calderfs motion to convert his Chapter 7 proceeding to a
Q

Chapter 13 proceeding.

7

As indicated at n.6 supra, the "undisclosed assets "are de
minimis and their non-disclosure as a basis for denying Calder a
general discharge in bankruptcy is currently on appeal.
8

Calder has also appealed this decision to the United States
District Court for the District of Utah in Case No. 89-C-59W.
This appeal is still pending.
-21-

Utah law recognizes that "the attorney against whom the
accusations [of unethical conduct] have been made is entitled to
a fair hearing and an opportunity to know all that he must meet
and the right to present such evidence as he may be able to
produce, to rebut or overcome the allegation of misconduct."
re Strong,

616

P.2d

583, 586

(Utah

1980)

(Emphasis

In

added).

Clearly, the Panel's decision, over Calder*s objection, to allow
the introduction of the non-dischargability decision prejudiced
Calder by injecting 1988 issues into what the Bar represented
were 1983 to 1986 Complaints.

The admission into evidence of

Calderfs bankruptcy schedules and statements of affairs and the
bankruptcy court's 1988 orders disposing of those filings was
completely improper.

It prejudically expanded the scope of the

allegations against Calder without any advance notice or meaningful opportunity to rebut the new charges.

If ever there was a

procedural ambush at the O.K. Corral, it is this case.
The Bar may well argue that because Calderfs former
counsel failed to object to some of the procedural action challenged by this appeal, Calder impliedly consented to an expansion
of

the

issues

However,

it

prejudice
undisclosed

originally

is well

to

the

articulated

recognized

party

against

that
whom

in the two Complaints.
the presence
evidence

on

of

unfair

previously

issues is offered, precludes any finding that the
-22-

party

impliedly

consented

to

the

trying

of

that

issue.

As

Professor Moore has stated:
The purpose of an amendment to conform to
proof is to bring the pleadings in line with
the actual issues upon which the case was
tried; therefore an amendment after judgment
which brings in some entirely extrinsic issue
or changes the theory on which the case was
actually tried
is not permissible, even
though there is evidence in the record —
introduced as relevant to some other issue —
which would support the amendment.
This
principle is sound since it cannot be fairly
said that there is any implied consent to try
an issue if the parties do not squarely
recognize it as an issue in the trial. The
test should be whether the defendant would be
prejudiced by the implied amendment, i.e.,
whether he had a fair opportunity to defend
and whether he could offer any additional
evidence if the case were to be retried on a
different theory.
In terms of the Rule,
where such prejudice is found, it can be said
that no implied consent exists."
3 Moore's Federal Practice H 15.13[2] at 15-131 (1989).

(Empha-

sis added).
Thus, in the case at hand, it can safely be said that
Calder's
against

understanding
him

Complaints

—

was

that

and
they

Complaints

expectation
were

of

defined

the claims
and

measured

asserted
by

that nowhere mentioned or called

the
into

question the propriety of his conduct in his own personal bankruptcies.

The justification advanced by the Bar's prosecutor for

the admission of such evidence —
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that proof of Calder's conduct

in his own bankruptcies was relevant to his state of mind, see
Tr. 182 —
at

never put Calder on notice that his 1988 conduct was

issue and could form the basis for substantive

improper conduct for which he could be disbarred.

findings of

As such, there

is no way Calder could be deemed to have impliedly consented to
an amendment of the Complaints.
Moreover,

many

courts

have

stated

that

object alone does not constitute implied consent.

failure

to

Southwestern

Stationery and Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 624 F.2d 168
(10th Cir. 1980) (when plaintiffs sought a Rule 15(b) amendment
on the basis of evidence which was also relevant to the pleaded
claim, there was no implied consent to the trial of the unpleaded
claims even though the defendant made no objection to the evidence);

McCleod v. Stevens, 617 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1980) (since

all evidence

introduced

was

relevant

to the pleaded

equitable

claim, failure of defendant to object to its admission was not an
implied consent to trial of an unpleaded damages claim).
The applicability of this principle to Calder1s appeal
is obvious:

while the Bar sought to justify the introduction of

the 1988 conduct on the basis that it went to Calderfs state of
mind in his representation of Messrs. Bailey and Job, the Panel
then used the 1988 conduct as substantive support for separate
factual findings that Calder acted unethically.
-24-

On that basis,

no fewer than five of the twelve separate Findings (Findings Nos.
3f

4, 5, 6 and 7) articulate various aspects of Calder's 1988

conduct.

From those findings, the Panel then issued a multitude

of conclusions of law reciting Calder!s supposed "dishonesty and
Q

fraud."

See e.g. Conclusions Nos. K b ) , (c), (d) and 2(b)).

other words, Calder

never understood,

nor could he

In

reasonably

have been required to understand, that the evidence of his 1988
conduct adduced by the Bar's prosecutor would be relied upon as
an independent basis for the making of substantiative findings of
fact on which the Bar would base its decision (at least in part)
to disbar him.

As such, it cannot be said that Calder impliedly

consented to the introduction of such issues.
Finally,

there

is

at

least

one

additional

reason

militating against any finding that Calder impliedly consented to
being tried for his 1988 conduct.

Under Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b),

the Bar would have been required to state with particularity the
circumstances alleged to constitute the fraudulent or dishonest
conduct of which

it was complaining.

9

(See Rule XII (b) of the

Interestingly, the Panel's only conclusions of "dishonesty and
fraud" are those based upon Calder's 1988 conduct in his own
bankruptcies — conduct never disclosed by the Complaints. Take
away that conduct and this proceeding presents, at best, little
more than a lawyer's inadvertent neglect of his clients' interests, hardly a case justifying disbarment.
-25-

Procedures).

Obviously, by refraining from making such allega-

tions in the Complaints, and then springing those allegations on
Calder for the first time at trial, the Bar deprived Calder of
any opportunity to receive an advance itemization of the precise
conduct deemed to be fraudulent; it deprived him of any opportunity to intelligently address those charges; and, it precluded
him from taking any of the procedural steps contemplated by the
rules to require the Bar, like any other litigant, to articulate
with specificity the precise factual basis on which it was making
allegations of fraudulent conduct.

The need for such specificity

has been aptly stated by one court as follows:
The pleading of fraud, however, is also the
last remaining habitat of the common law
notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out
non-meritorious actions on the basis of the
pleadings.
Thus, the pleadings should be
sufficient fto enable the courts to determine
whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any
foundation, prima facie at least, for the
charge of fraud.fW
[Citation omitted.]
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.,
673 P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1983).
Because

Calder

was

deprived

of

any

opportunity

to

understand or respond to the allegations of fraud made against
him

for

the

first

time

at

trial,
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the

Panel's

Findings

and

Conclusions, particularly

Findings Nos. 3f

4, 5, 6 and 7 and

Conclusions Nos. K b ) , (c), (d) and 2(b) must be vacated.
ARGUMENT II
THE PANEL'S TOTAL MISAPPREHENSION OF THE 1979
VERSION OF S 41-12-15 OF THE UTAH MOTOR
VEHICLE ACT INDUCED A SERIES OF CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDINGS. THEREFORE, THESE
FINDINGS MUST BE VACATED.
The major
and

Conclusions

omission

assumption

in the

of an alleged

underlying

Bailey

case

judgment

the Board's

is that

but

Findings

for Calder's

lien from Bailey's

bankruptcy

schedules, Bailey would have been able to obtain an automatic
renewal of his Utah driver's license and pursue certain undefined
employment

opportunities.

Conclusion

Nos.

1(e)

and

(See Finding Nos. 1(a) and
(g)).

However,

this

(j) and

assumption

totally unsupported by Utah law in effect in 1979 —

is

the year in

which Bailey claimed he was denied a renewed driver's license.
(Tr. 35).

Specifically, the 1979 version of S 41-12-15 of the

Utah Motor Vehicle Act stated in pertinent part:
A discharge
in bankruptcy following
the
rendering of any such judgment shall not
relieve the judgment debtor from any of the
requirements of this act."
Therefore,

even

if

the

judgment

allegedly

rendered

against Bailey had been discharged in bankruptcy, that discharge
would

not

have

relieved

Bailey
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from

satisfying

the

judgment

through payment
license.

as a pre-condition

to renewal of his driver's

His assertion and the Panel's assumption to the con-

trary constitute a misapprehension of law which fatally induced a
serious of clearly erroneous factual findings.

Obviously, this

Court may regard a finding as clearly erroneous if it determines
that it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

State v.

On that basis alone, the

Court should vacate every factual finding made by the Panel in
the Bailey proceeding.
ARGUMENT III
BECAUSE IT IS THE SOLE AND ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COURT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINE ON
CALDER, THIS RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE DELEGATED UNQUALIFIEDLY TO THE BAR. AS SUCH, THE
BAR'S FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION ARE ADVISORY IN NATURE AND ARE ENTITLED
TO
LITTLE
OF THE DEFERENCE
CUSTOMARILY
ACCORDED FACTUAL FINDINGS.
For more than forty years, this Court has made a number
of pronouncements regarding the standard applicable to its review
of

findings,

discipline.

conclusions

and

recommendations

regarding

lawyer

The Court has stated on various occasions that the

Bar's findings and recommendations should be adopted absent some
showing

that

they

are

arbitrary,

capricious,

otherwise not supported by substantial evidence.

unreasonable

See, e.g. , In

re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 61, 633 (1960) (".
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or

. . we

deem it discreet and proper to indulge considerable latitude to
the actions and judgment of the commission in such [disciplinary]
matters and would not disregard its finding and recommendation in
the

absence of some persuasive

reason

for doing

so.");

In re

Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343, 344 (1965) ("nevertheless
this Court is disposed

. . .

to look upon the findings and the

recommendations of the Bar Commission with indulgence; and not to
disregard

its action lightly, nor at all unless there is some-

thing

persuade

to

this

Court

that

the

Commission

has

acted

capriciously or arbitrarily or beyond the scope of its powers, or
is plainly in error1').
On the other hand, this Court has also stated that the
Bar's recommendations are not " . . .
.

. ." as typical findings of fact

responsibility

to discipline

"...

an erring

delegate that duty to others . . . "
1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970).

to be in the same category
because

attorney

it is our

and we cannot

In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d

Accord, In re Hughes, 534 P.2d 892 (Utah

1975) (Court stated it was " . . . not bound to the recommendation
of the Bar Commission . . . " ) .
in

the

applicable

standard

It was this seeming inconsistency
of

review

that

prompted

Justice

Wilkins in a concurring decision in In re Robert B. Hansen, 584
P.2d 805 (Utah 1978), to state:
I respectfully suggest that this duality of
standards (appearing both within a single
-29-

case and in cases compared one with the
other) creates uncertainties and contradictions which now require analysis,
I believe for clarity and guidance, this
Court should state unequivocally that the
recommendations by the Bar are advisory only
as ". . . w e cannot delegate that duty [of
disciplining attorneys] to others . . ."
(Footnote omitted) (Emphasis in original).
Shortly

after

Justice

Wilkins

made

his

plea

for

a

clearly stated and consistently applied standard of review, the
Court

in In re Phil L. Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1978)

stated that " . . . the recommendation of the Bar is only advisory
and . . . the sanction or penalty to be imposed is for this court
to determine
than

two

[numerous

months

citations omitted]."

later,

the

Court

appeared

However, no more
to

revert

to

the

principle that the Bar's findings must be upheld unless they are
found

to

be

arbitrary,

capricious

or

unreasonable.

Blackham, 588 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1978).

In

re

Since that time, the

Court has adhered to this principle on at least one occasion.

In

re Judd, 629 P.2d 437, 438 (Utah 1981) ("unless it appears that
the Commission has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, or unless
those findings were not supported by substantial evidence," the
findings will be upheld on appeal).
However, in In re McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986), the
Court

recently

recognized

and

-30-

stated

that

the

Bar's

recommendation
Court

of discipline

which may then

ment. 1 "

Id. at 705.

is

"only

that

" . . .

may be reviewed by this

'take any action agreeable

to

its judg-

The rationale for this standard of review

discipline

which

does

not

affect

the

lawyer's

continued ability to practice is delegated to the Bar Commission.
Suspension or disbarment can be authorized only by the Supreme
Court."
factual
merely

Id. at 709.
findings
advisory

Therefore, it now appears

underlying
in nature

recommendations
and

not

entitled

of

in Utah that

disbarment

to any

are

particular

deference.
As demonstrated below, application of this standard of
review to the facts of this case mandates the Court's rejection
of

the

Findings,

Conclusions

and

Recommendation

in

their

entirety.

10

Moreover, even if the Court elects for whatever reason to
apply a more stringent standard of review, many of the Findings
and Conclusions and the entire Recommendation are so arbitrary
and infused with plain error as to require their rejection. See
Argument VI infra.
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ARGUMENT IV
MANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE
PANEL CONCLUDED THAT CALDER SHOULD BE DISBARRED WERE EITHER NOT ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND/OR ARE SO CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AS TO REQUIRE THAT THEY BE VACATED.
A.

Many of the Findings are Unsupported by Clear and
Convincing Evidence,

Rule XII(c) of the Procedures states that "the burden
of proof shall be on Bar counsel to sustain the formal committee
complaint,

or various

evidence."

The term

defined

to mean

that

'highly probable.1"
at 796

(1972).

counts

thereof, by clear

"clear and convincing
".

. . the

truth

and

convincing

evidence" has been

of

the

contention

is

McCormick, Handbook of the Lav of Evidence

This Court

has defined

"clear

and

convincing

evidence" to ". . . b e such that there is no serious nor substantial doubt what [the proposition for which the proof is offered]
is."
words,

Paulsen v. Coombs, 254 P.2d 621, 624 (Utah 1953).
"clear

and

convincing

evidence"

implies

In other

something

more

than the usual requirement of a preponderence of the evidence,
but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Child

v. Child. 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1958).
In this case, there are at least two factors present in
the Bailey proceeding that make it impossible for the clear and
convincing

standard

to be met.
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First,

the

Panel

explicitly

acknowledged
proceeding
testimony

that

Calder's

ethical

was determined

in large part

(as to the terms

assumed commitment
then-counsel,

C.

culpability

in

the

by balancing

and conditions of his

Bailey

Calder's

voluntarily

to assist Bailey) against that of the Bar's
Jeffrey

Paoletti.

The

Panel

could

not

be

clearer:
Though [Calder] presented conflicting evidence as to the agreement, the Panel accepted
[Paoletti's] testimony as the most credible
evidence of [Calder's] agreement to represent
Mr. Bailey in amending his Bankruptcy.
However,

Paoletti

frankly

acknowledged

in his

testimony

that

" . . . I don't have a clear recollection of all of the events."
(Tr. 121).

In the face of that admission, it is inconceivable

that the Panel could determine that Paoletti's

inherently hazy

testimony

could

and

evidence,

especially

rise

to

the

where

level

Calder

of

"clear

himself

convincing"

testified

that

his

agreement with the Bar was far different than the one Paoletti
was having trouble remembering.

As a matter of law, Paoletti's

testimony could never be deemed "clear and convincing."
Second, much of the "evidence" supporting the Panel's
finding that Calder's omission of the judgment precluded Bailey
from obtaining a Utah driver's license is comprised of hearsay,
i.e., what an unspecified representative of the Utah Department
of Motor Vehicles allegedly told Bailey the consequences of his
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failure to have the judgment satisfied or discharged would be.
(See Tr. 35, 76). Absent any copy of the alleged judgment or any
official

records

Vehicles

tending

maintained
to

by

the

corroborate

Utah

the

Department

hearsay

of

testimony,

quality of the evidence is singularly unsatisfactory.
the rationale for excluding hearsay evidence
dence

is

intrinsically

untrustworthy,

Motor
the

Indeed, if

is that such evi-

it clearly

follows

that

once such evidence is admitted, it cannot alone constitute "clear
and convincing11 evidence.

See State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,

310

(Hearsay

P.2d

388,

390

(1957)

evidence

is generally

admissible on the ground that it lacks trustworthiness
basic reasons:

(i)

not

for two

the person who purports to know the facts is

not stating them under oath; (ii)

that person is not present for

cross-examination).
Accordingly, none of the findings
ceeding

have

been

established

by

the

in the Bailey pro-

"clear

and

convincing"

standard imposed by the Bar's own rules of procedure.

As such,

all of the Findings in this proceeding must be vacated.
B.

Many of The Findings Are Clearly Erroneous.

In

asking

the

Court

to

set

aside

a

number

of

the

Findings on the basis that they are clearly erroneous, Calder
recognizes his obligation to:
[M]arshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings and to then
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demonstrate even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the factual determinations
made by the trial court, that the evidence is
insufficient to support its findings.
Harline v. Campbell, 720 P.2d 980f 982 (Utah 1986).

This burden

is discharged below.
1.

Finding No. 1(a);

Mr. Bailey originally retained [Calder] to
file a bankruptcy in 1978. Problems arose in
this bankruptcy respecting the discharge of a
certain judgment debt which precluded Mr.
Bailey
from
obtaining
a Utah
driver's
license.
The only evidence in the record tending to support this Finding
is as follows:
Q. I am sorry. Let me ask you to resume your
testimony.
Tell us the circumstances under
which you sought to renew your driver's
license. What happened?
A. I went down to the Driver's Bureau on my
birthday, took the test and eye test and was
just about given my license when a lady
punched the computer and said I had a financial judgment against me.
(Tr. 35, lines 16-22).
After Bailey informed Calder of his conversation with the unspecified "lady" at the Driver's Bureau, Calder wrote a letter to the
Bureau

informing

judgment
B-4).

debt

it

of

his

recollection

had been discharged

that

the

in bankruptcy.

purported
(Trial

Ex.

An additional reference to the purported judgment is found
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at Tr. 307-311.

However, it is devoid of any additional testi-

mony tending to corroborate even remotely the accuracy of the
hearsay evidence.
Thus, Finding No. 1(a) is founded
evidence, far short
Court

determines

further

of being

to

evidentiary

"clear

strike

it

support

for

for

on

and convincing."
that

it.

solely

As

reason,
such

hearsay
If the

there

the

is

no

finding

is

clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained.
2*

Finding No. K b ) ;

In or about October 1983, [Calder] entered
into an engagement with Mr. Bailey, arranged
through Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti, to
resolve an investigation of a disciplinary
complaint
filed
by
Mr.
Bailey
against
[Calder].
By
this
engagement,
[Calder]
agreed that he would obtain an amendment to
Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy schedule and obtain a
discharge for Mr. Bailey of a judgment debt
owed by Mr. Bailey to Richard D. and Morren
C. Harris in the sum of about $1,400.
The only evidence even remotely tending to support this Finding
is found at Tr. 122-25.

However, that testimony nowhere estab-

lishes that Calder ever entered into an engagement with Bailey.
Rather,

the

evidence

establishes

Paoletti's

impression

that

H
And, as demonstrated in Argument II supra, even if the purported judgment had been listed on Bailey's bankruptcy schedule
and thereby been discharged, that fact alone would not have permitted Bailey to obtain a Utah driver's license as this Finding
seems to suggest.
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Calder would obtain an amendment to Bailey's bankruptcy schedules
for a fee of $10.00 and that Paoletti would write a letter to
Bailey

reflecting

B-12).

Paoletti's

understanding.

(id.;

Trial

Ex.

Notably, however, the record is devoid of any evidence

that Paoletti

ever provided Calder with

a copy of

the

letter

reflecting Paoletti's understanding of the agreement.

The record

establishes

Bailey

only

an

agreement

between

Paoletti

and

to

which Calder was never privy.
In addition, the Finding

inaccurately recites that it

was Paoletti who "arranged" the so-called "engagement."

Indeed,

the evidence establishes that it was Calder who volunteered, with
no pressure from the Bar, to attempt to resolve the problem:
At that time the screening panel determined
that the [Bailey] complaint was not timely
filed, based on the statute of limitations
and, therefore, determined that it would be
dismissed for that reason.
But in the
hearing, when Mr. Calder appeared, Mr. Calder
volunteered, said that he would proceed with
amending the schedules and getting the matter
taken care of.
(Tr. 122).
to

give

The Panel's omission of this fact appears calculated

the

inaccurate

impression

that

the

impetus

engagement came from the Bar's counsel and not Calder.
3.

Finding No. 1(c):

"[Calder] agreed to complete the engagement
and achieve the objective upon Mr. Bailey's
paying $10.00 for additional attorney's fees;
-37-

for

the

Mr. Bailey made said payment of $10.00 to
[Calder]."
The only evidence tending to support this finding is again found
at

pages

122-24 of Mr. Paelotti's

testimony.

Interestingly,

Paoletti starts his testimony by indicating that Calder informed
him that "we need $10.00 to cover the costs." (Tr. 122) (Emphasis
added).

On

the

following

page, however, Paoletti

states

his

understanding that the $10.00 was the total "fee" for the service
(Tr. 123). Then, several pages later, Paoletti confesses that he
really doesn't know whether the $10.00 was required as a filing
fee or as an attorney's fee:
I recall when Mr. Calder was in, that he
said—that he basically proposed that for a
$10.00 fee, for whatever reason he needed the
$10.00 for filing fee or whatever, that he
would resolve this matter.
(Tr. 130)(Emphasis
precise

charges

added).

for which

Paoletti's
Calder

inability to recall the

was willing

to complete

the

"engagement" is consistent with his earlier admission that he did
not " . . .have a clear recollection of all of the events." (Tr.
121).
the

Finally, Paoletti's obvious confusion

fact

that

at page

125

of

his

is highlighted by

testimony,

he

states

that

" . . .the resolution at the end of that conversation was that he
[Calder] was to take an additional $15," for costs but that he
was

not

prepared

to

waive

any

attorney's

problem.
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fees

to

solve

the

These

inconsistencies

in

neither hypertechnical nor academic.

Paoletti's

testimony

are

For the Panel is seeking to

sanction Calder in part for his failure to adhere to the terms of
the

"engagement."

If

the

contours

of

the

"engagement"

were

unclear or confusing to Paoletti, it hardly seems appropriate to
sanction

Calder

for

his

failure

terms, especially where Paoletti

to

understand

never provided

or

follow

Calder

its

with a

copy of the confirming letter Paoletti sent to Bailey.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Finding No. 1(c) ,
the evidence underlying the Finding can stand for no more than
the proposition

that

Paoletti

and

Calder

never

had

a

clear,

common understanding regarding the terms and conditions on which
the "engagement" would go forward.

By determining

(or at least

certainly implying) that the "engagement" was cast in reasonably
and clear and intelligible terms which Calder should have understood, Finding No. 1(c) takes indecent

liberties with the evi-

dence.
4.

Finding No. 1(d).

"After accepting the engagement and agreeing
upon the fee to be charged, [Calder] demanded
additional money from Mr. Bailey, in the
amount of $120.00, in order to initiate the
engagement.
Mr. Bailey complained to Mr.
Paoletti about this additional fee."
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The record establishes

that

after the

Calder to take the engagement

initial

"agreement"

for $10.00 as a "filing

whatever," see Tr. 130, Calder discovered

that

for

fee or

Bailey's

bank-

ruptcy files had been closed by the court clerk and shipped to a
central

filing office

The additional court
$50.00.

in Denver, Colorado.
imposed

(Tr. 124-5, 329).

cost to reopen the case would be

(Tr. 329; Trial Ex. B-15).

The remaining $70.00 of the

$120.00 amount Calder quoted was for his attorney's
Trial Ex. B-15, —

fees which

never waived by Calder.

Paoletti

himself

conceded

Q.
Did Mr. Calder during this telephone
conversation tell you that he would take care
of the problem for an additional $15?
That's my recollection.

Q.
Did he mention anything to you at that
time about a fee of $100?
A. Well I remember—yes. We talked about a
fee.
Whether it was $100 specifically or
not, I don't remember. But I do remember he
talked about a fee that he thought he should
be paid for the additional work that he was
doing. But the resolution at the end of that
conversation was that he was to take an
additional $15.00.
Q. Did you understand that he was prepared
to waive any such fees to get the problem
done?
A.

were

(Tr. 125). Paolettifs testimony on this

point could not be clearer:

A.

fees, see

Well, that wasn't my understanding."
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(Tr. 125, lines 5-19)(Emphasis added).
Therefore, contrary to the Panel's finding that Calder
"agreed upon the

[lesser] fee [of $15.00] to be charged,"

the

testimony of the Bar's own former counsel is that Calder never
agreed

to

waive

Accordingly,

the

there

is

fee
no

and

thereby

support

for

confine
the

it

to

Finding's

$15.00.
apparent

implication that Calder acted improperly in "demanding additional
money from Mr. Bailey."
5.

Finding No. 1(e);

"Subsequent to the October 1983 engagement,
numerous
communications
were
exchanged
between Mr. Bailey and [Calder], and between
[Calder] and Bar Counsel which concluded with
[Calder's]
reaffirming
his
agreement
to
continue representing Mr. Bailey in amending
the bankruptcy schedules. Mr. Bailey paid an
additional $15.00 to [Calder], at [Calder's]
request in furtherance of the engagement."
This finding is misleading insofar as it omits any mention of Mr.
Paoletti's recollection that Calder was not " . . .prepared to
waive

any

such

Therefore, while
reaffirmed

his

fees
there

to

get

the

problem

is certainly

agreement

to

some

continue

amending his bankruptcy schedules, there

done."
evidence

representing

(Tr. 125).
that

Calder

Bailey

is no support

in

for the

Panel's apparent assumption that Calder ever agreed to do so by
waiving his attorney's fees or that he later acted improperly in
withdrawing from the case when those fees were not paid.
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6.

Finding No, 1(g):

"Though
[Calder]
presented
conflicting
evidence as to the agreement, the Panel
accepted
former
Bar
Counsel
C.
Jeffrey
Paoletti's testimony as the most credible
evidence of [Calder1s] agreement to represent
Mr, Bailey in amending his bankruptcy."
This

finding

defects

that

suffers

from

Paoletti

the

confessed

obvious,

previously

to the sketchy

discussed

nature

of

his

recollection of the "agreement" and that his testimony as to what
the "agreement" was is hopelessly contradictory.

(See pp. 30, 31

above).
7.

Finding No. 1(h);

[Calder] filed
a Motion
to Reopen Mr.
Bailey's case, but the Motion was inadequate
on its face."
Calder frankly acknowledged at trial that the Motion to Reopen
was

not

complete

529-30).

and

would

need

to

be

supplemented.

(Tr.

Calder's explanation for filing the motion in that form

was that "we had to put [in] a lot of other things and we had to
get the file from Denver."

(Tr. 529)

The Bar f s finding, how-

ever, omits any mention of the justification advanced by Calder
and seeks to create the
heedlessly
Thus, when

filed papers
properly

impression
calculated

reviewed

in

that Calder
to

and

injure his own clients.

context,

this

support the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
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recklessly

Finding

cannot

8.

Finding No, 1(i):

"After filing the Motion [to Reopen Bailey1s
bankruptcy case] with the Bankruptcy Court,
[Calder] failed to follow through with his
representation of Mr. Bailey by failing to
schedule the Motion to Reopen for hearing and
by failing to present the Motion to the judge
for consideration."
The record reflects that after Calder filed the motion to reopen
in January,

1984 —

supplemented

with

a motion which
information

that

he

knew would

he

had

have

ordered

to be

from

Bankruptcy Court's central filing office in Denver, Colorado
Calder refrained

from noticing

it up for hearing.

the
—

(Tr. 529).

Before this information was received from the Denver office and
incorporated in the motion then on file, the bankruptcy court sua
sponte denied the motion without prejudice.
Moreover, what the Finding

fails to reflect

(Trial Ex. B-19).
is that after the

court denied the motion, Bailey's successor counsel was successful in having the purportedly omitted debt discharged
ruptcy.

(Tr. 57).
9.

Finding No. l(i):

"The Motion to Reopen was denied, and,
immediately upon learning of the court's
order, [Calder] withdrew from representing
Mr. Bailey.
At no time after February 16,
1984, did [Calder] make any effort to obtain
substitute counsel for Bailey, return the
$10.00 paid by Bailey, refund any portion of
the original attorney's fees and costs paid
by Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps
with the Department of Motor Vehicles to
-43-

in bank-

assist Bailey to obtain a driverfs license
or, in any other way, assist Bailey in
achieving the desired objective."
There

are

several

evidentiary

deficiencies

in

this

Finding.

First, the Finding fails to mention the reason why Calder withdrew

as

Bailey's

counsel,

namely,

that

upon

learning

court's action, Bailey berated Calder's office staff.

of

the

(Tr. 356;

12
Trial Ex. B-20).

Second, the evidence is devoid of any indica-

tion that Bailey ever asked Calder
substitute counsel.

to assist him

in obtaining

Indeed, the record does reflect that shortly

after the motion to reopen was denied without prejudice, Bailey's
new counsel obtained the requested relief.
Tr.

57).

whether

Third,

Bailey's

the
$10.00

only

evidence

payment

was

in

(Trial Exhibit B-22;
the

refunded

record
is

regarding

inconclusive.

The only testimony on that issue is as follows:
Q.
And that money has never been tendered
back to Mr. Bailey, has it?
A.
I've been thinking about that for the
last six or seven months. To be honest with
you, I don't know whether it was tendered
back.
I don't know where the money is now.
I can't really remember the $10.
I could
have sent it back to him.
I just don't
really know."

!2 Bailey did deny that he ever became agitated at Calder's secretary.
(Tr. 99). However, there is no evidence that he ever
took issue with, or otherwise responded to, Calder's claim in th-e
letter of February 16, 1984 (Trial Ex. B-20) that his behavior
was n . . . too offensive for my secretaries and myself.
-44-

(Tr. 326, lines 13-19).

Notably, the record

testimony

regarding

by Mr.

Bailey

whether

is devoid of any

this

fee was

ever

refunded.
Fourth, while it is true that Calder never refunded any
portion of the original attorney's fees and costs which Bailey
paid

to him

withdrew—it

in 1978—some

six years before

is

to

difficult

understand

Calder

how

the

ultimately
Panel

could

believe such an obligation existed in light of the Bar's decision
in 1983 to dismiss

Bailey's

statute of limitations.

complaint

as being barred by the

It is only because Calder unilaterally

volunteered to assist Bailey in amending his schedules to reflect
the

allegedly

omitted

judgment

debt

that

attorney's fees could even arguably arise.

any

duty

to

refund

Clearly, this duty

could be no broader than the scope of legal services that Calder
was performing after he assumed the obligation to amend Bailey's
bankruptcy

schedules;

it

could

not

extend

to

legal

performed before that voluntary commitment was made.
10.

Finding No. l(k);

On or about April 16, 1984, [Calder], being
under oath, prepared, signed and filed an
affidavit in the case of Bailey v. Calder,
Civil No. C85-800, then pending in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, wherein [Calder] knowingly and
intentionally made the following misrepresentations and false statements:
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services

1)
That after Judge Mabey had originally granted an application to reopen Mr.
Bailey's case, the client was "to pay a
$60.00 filing fee to the court and also a
$10.00 fee to add the creditor that he had
omitted, when, in fact, there was no such
financial arrangement at that time;
2)
That after 1979, [Calder] had not
had any contact with Bailey until 1982 when,
in fact Bailey had contacted [Calder] on
several occasions prior to that date;
3)
That [Calder] did not represent
Bailey as his attorney in 1982 inasmuch as
Bailey
had
refused
to pay
anything
to
[Calder]
as
requested,
when,
in
fact,
[Calder] had written to Bailey in 1982
advising Bailey that [Calder] was proceeding
with this case;
4)
That he had agreed to help Mr.
Bailey in 1983 at the request of the Utah
State Bar but that nothing more was done
because Bailey refused to pay money when, in
fact, Bailey had paid, in full, all the money
requested pursuant to the agreement;
5) That in 1983 he was not representing
Mr. Bailey because Bailey had not paid his
retainer fee and had "paid no money to [him]"
when, in fact, Bailey had paid all fees
required under the agreement; and
6)
That at no time after 1978 had
[Calder] represented Bailey in any bankruptcy
matters, when, in fact, he had represented
Bailey, had advised Bailey about bankruptcy
matters, and had filed motions for Bailey as
Bailey's attorney both in 1979 and in 1984.
(a)

Finding No. l(k)(3).
the

affidavit

Bailey

in

that

1982
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is

Calder's statement
he

did

not

factually

in

represent
incorrect.

However,

there

is

no

evidence

that

the

inaccurate statement was made "knowingly and
intentionally/1 as found by the Panel.
(b)

Finding No. l(k)(4).

In light of the discus-

sion at pages 36-45 supra, Calder1s statement
in the affidavit that Calder refrained from
taking

further

payment

of

action

additional

pending
attorney's

Bailey's
fees

is

factually accurate.
(c)

Finding

No.

l(k)(5).

While

Calder

was

mistaken in asserting that he did not represent

Bailey

in 1983, Calderfs

the affidavit

statement

that Bailey had not paid his

retainer fee isf

in light of the discussion

at pages 36-45 supraf correct.
11.

Finding No. K m ) :

"When [Calder] filed a personal Chapter 13 on
February 23f 1984, he did not list Bailey as
a creditor
even
though, at
that
time,
[Calder] knew that he was required to list
all known and contingent liabilities and also
knew that Bailey probably had a claim against
him for his failure to comply with the terms
of the agreement to achieve the desired
objective.
[Calder] did not seek to amend
his 1984 Chapter 13 to add Bailey as a
creditor until January 31, 1986 even though,
as early as February 1985 [Calder] knew that
Bailey had filed a malpractice action against
-47-

in

him in the Third Judicial
Civil No. C85-800."

District

Court,

The only direct evidence regarding whether Calder knew or should
have known that Bailey had a claim against him in his own Chapter
13 contradicts this finding.

The record is as follows:

Q.
Did you think he [Bailey] had any claim
against you or any cause to be concerned
about your services?
A.

No, did not.

Q.

You did not?

A.

Did not.

(Tr. 358, lines 3-9).
bankruptcy,
possible

had

an

claimants

In addition, Calder, like any debtor in

incentive
so that

to

list

the

greatest

number

of

any conceivable debt would be dis-

charged or paid on a compromised basis in his Chapter 13 plan.
It would

make

no

sense

for

Calder

to

knowingly

refrain

from

enumerating all possible claims if the effect of the omission was
to prevent the claim from being discharged in bankruptcy.
corollary

to this proposition,

validly contend

it

is impossible

that he was prejudiced

As a

for Bailey to

in any way by Calder f s

omission of him as a creditor or potential creditor, because so
long as the purported debt was omitted, it remained in full force
and effect for Baileyfs benefit.
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Finally,
Bailey's

the

malpractice

Finding

action

is devoid

against

Calder

of

any mention

was

dismissed

that
with

prejudice at the conclusion of Bailey's case in chief at trial.
(Tr. 7 ) .
12.

Finding No. l(o):

[Calder1s] 1984 Chapter 13 case was dismissed
by Judge Allen on July 31, 1986, as having
been filed in bad faith. The court's order
of dismissal is final and non-appealable. No
credible evidence was presented to indicate
that the dismissal of [Calder's] 1984 Chapter
13 was for reasons other than that it was
filed in bad faith or that the Bankruptcy
Court had any reason to dismiss the case
other than on the merits as set forth in
Judge Allen's ruling of July 30, 1986.
The obvious problem with this Finding is that it is based on the
transcript

of

Judge

(See Trial Ex. B-37).

Allen's

five-page

ruling

from

Significantly, the Finding

upon any of the underlying

evidence supposedly

the bench.

is not based

relied upon by

Judge Allen to support the ruling. As such, the Finding violates
the salutary principle of In Re Strong supra, 616 P.2d at 583
that the Bar must do more than simply . . . adopt the findings of
some other tribunal

. . .," and must introduce the evidentiary

record generated in the prior proceeding.

JEd. at 587.

Accord-

ingly, this finding must be set aside and the issues remanded to
the Panel with instructions to adduce the underlying transcript
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and afford Calder an opportunity to explain and rebut the testimony contained in the transcript.
13.

Finding No. l(p):

Mr. Bailey was unable to obtain employment
for a substantial period of time due to his
inability to obtain a driver's license.
As demonstrated in Argument II supraf this finding appears to be
based upon the erroneous premise that obtaining a discharge of
the judgment would automatically have allowed Bailey to obtain a
renewed

driver's

substantive

law

license.

The Panel's misapprehension

governing

this

issue

improperly

of

the

induced

an

erroneous factual finding.
14.

Finding No. 2(b):

At the time [Calder] agreed to file a Chapter
7 case for Mr. and Mrs. Jobf [Calder] knew
that (1) Mr. Job was a plaintiff in a lawsuit
entitled Job, et al. v. Pocklington, et al.,
which was then pending in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah,
Civil No. C82-1085Cf (2) Mr. Job was seeking
a substantial amount of money and damages, in
excess of $1,000,000 in such suit, (3) the
cause of action had to be listed as an asset
in Job's Chapter 7 case, and (4) Job wanted
the asset listed in his Chapter 7 case.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, [Calder] did
not take reasonable steps and precautions to
insure that this cause of action was properly
scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 case.
The evidence supporting this finding consists primarily of Job's
testimony at pages 138-149 of the trial transcript.
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On page 145,

Job

testifies

that

he

" . . . talked to

[Calder] about

[the

Pocklington case], and he wrote it down on a piece of paper" and
that

" • . . there was documentation there in his handwriting

that I gave the asset to him."

And, on page 146 of the tran-

script, Job stated that "he [Calder] made sure that he wrote a
note

and

testimony

was

going

to

take

care

of

that

situation."

Job's

establishes, therefore, that he provided Calder with

some information regarding his claim against Pocklington.
However, Calderfs testimony was that "the way Job gave
it to me he had a possible claim against the Pacific Coast League
for defamation of Peter Pocklington.
(Tr. 196, 406).
characterized
"undetermined"

The value undetermined."

It is difficult to imagine why Calder would have

the claim

as a "possible" claim whose value was

if Job had actually

informed him that the claim

was embodied by a lawsuit for which specified damages were being
sought.
he

Indeed, under cross examination, Job acknowledged that

refrained

from

providing

"many

details"

to

Calder.

testimony is as follows:
Q.:
"All right.
You indicated that you, I
believe, in your previous testimony, that you
had gotten that [a copy of Job's bankruptcy
schedule] from going to Mr. Calder!s and
getting a copy of that document; is that
correct?
A.:

Yes f I did.
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That

Q.:
Does that fairly reflect what you told
Mr.
Calder
about
the Peter
Pocklington
matter?
A.: Wellf there was more. I told him I was
a stockholder in the Great Northern Baseball
Corporation,
I told him I was one of the
major stockholders of the Ogden A's Baseball
Club.
Q.:
All right.
The item in [Calder's
handwritten note of his first meeting with
Job] as it reads is: "As a possible claim of
the Pacific Coast League for defamation of
Peter Pocklington, value undetermined." What
did you tell him about the details of that
claim?
A.:
I didn't go into that many details, Mr.
Boone.
(Tr. page 195, lines 17-25, page 196, lines 1-7).
At

the very most,

therefore,

the

record

establishes

only that Job provided Calder with some information regarding a
possible

claim

that

he

had

against

Pocklington.

It

nowhere

establishes that Job ever mentioned that the Pocklington Case was
in fact

in

litigation;

that

Calder

was

ever

informed

of

the

amount of damages sought in the Pocklington Case; that Calder was
ever provided with any papers generated in the Pocklington Case;
or, that Calder was ever informed of the identity of any counsel
in the Pocklington Case.

(Tr. 196, 199, 200). The Panel took a

quantum leap in converting that testimony into a formal finding
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that Calder knew that the claim was embodied by a formal lawsuit
and was worth in excess of $lf000,000.
Viewing

the evidence

in the light most

favorable to

affirmance of the Finding, the most that can be said for it is
that Calder was inattentive to the actual dimensions of the claim
and should not have accepted at face value Job's description of
the claim.

The evidence falls far short of establishing Calderfs

actual knowledge of the structure and value of the claim and his
willful nondisclosure of that knowledge, as suggested by Finding
No. 2(b).
15.

Finding No. 2(c):

At the time [Calder] recommended that Job
file a Chapter 7, he did not discuss with Job
the option of filing under Chapter 13f and
did not mention any additional advantages
which Job might realize if he elected to
proceed under Chapter 13.
The only evidence in the record pertaining to this issue directly
contradicts this finding.

Calder testified as follows:

Q.:

Did you discuss with him [Job]

A.:

On April 25th

. . .

—

Q.:
—
the possibilities of filing a
Chapter 13 on October 19f 1983 when he came
in to see you?
A.: There had been some discussions in 1983
when he came in with the Chapter 7 at that
time.
He had wanted to know — if he was
behind in his house payments. He had problems with that and he wanted to know what
-53-

would happen in the future if he filed the
Chapter 7 now, and later on he had problems
with his house if he could file a Chapter 13.
There had been a discussion on Chapter 13 in
the future, sometime in the future.
(Tr. 428

lines

6-17).

Job's own testimony

on

that point

is

something less than a resounding contradiction of Calder1s:
Q.: Did he [Calder] mention Chapter 13 as a
possible source of relief?
A.: Not at the time that I filed my Chapter
7; or at least I don't recall that he did.
The foregoing evidence falls far short of clearly and convincingly establishing that Calder never mentioned to Job the option
of filing a Chapter 13 at the time he was initially retained.
such, this finding must be stricken.
16.

Finding No. 2(d):

Subsequently, on or about April 27, 1984 f
[Calder] rather than seeking to amend the
Chapter 7 schedules, filed a Chapter 13
proceeding, for which Mr. Job paid [Calder]
an additional $150.00, even though, in giving
this advice, [Calder] knew or should have
known, that:
1.
The Chapter 13 was likely to be
dismissed as a "bad faith filing"
in light of Job's previous discharge under Chapter 7;
2.

Job could not "save his home" under
the Chapter
13 unless
he had
regular income for which to make
payments;

3.

The Chapter 13 would be ineffective
unless the previous discharge of
-54-

As

the Chapter
vacated; and
4.

7

was

revoked

or

Job would not obtain a discharge
under his Chapter 13 case until he
had
successfully
completed
all
payments under the plan.

To understand the fallacies of this Finding, it is important to
note that
Calder

in the Chapter 13 plan that Calder proposed for Job,

specifically

stated

charge was to be revoked.

that Job's previous Chapter
(Tr. 423-24).

7 dis-

As such, the proposed

filing of the Chapter 13 plan on the heels of the earlier Chapter
7 plan was not " . . . likely to be dismissed as a "bad faith
filing".

Bankruptcy Judge Judith A. Boulden's testimony on that

point could not be clearer:
Q.:
At the time that the 13 was filed, do
you recall if there was problem with 13 being
filed on the heels of a 7?
A.:

Yes, I do recall there was a problem.

Q.:

Okay.

What was that problem?

A.: There is no specific statutory prohibition to what we term in the trade as Chapter
20. That means that a person can go through
a Chapter 7 and obtain a discharge and turn
around on the heels of that 7 and file a
Chapter 13 in order to deal with those kinds
of debts that may not be dischargeable under
Chapter 7 - student loans, child support,
alimony, perhaps mortgage arrearages, or some
unsecured debt that may - the debtor may wish
to reaffirm.
It at this time was an important issue
nationwide because there was no statutory
-55-

prohibition against it except to the extent
that a debtor is required to file a plan in
good faith and there was case law coming down
at that time indicating that that change of
events, if it were intentional and if it was
a design or an artifice to avoid paying
unsecured creditors, would render a plan
non-confirmable because it was filed in good
faith and that was an issue at that time, and
still an issue probably.
Q.: Was there a way around that problem if
you did certain things?
A.:
Yes,
There are a number of ways that
the —
evil could be remedied.
You could
request to have the Chapter 7 discharge
revoked, thus, legally reinstating all the
debt that had been discharged, bringing all
the debt into the Chapter 13 case and then
pay it, pay a portion or all of it.
Legally that is certainly the preferable
way to do it, because it legally reinstates
all the debt.w
(Tr. page 635, line 6-25, page 636 lines 1-14).

Thus, so long as

the previous Chapter 7 discharge was revoked (as Calder's Chapter
13 plan for Job so provided), the subsequent Chapter 13 filing
was never

likely

to be dismissed

as a "bad faith filing," as

suggested in Finding No. 2(d).
Next, there is no evidence in the record that a precondition to the filing of a Chapter 13 was the debtor's receipt of
a "regular

income with which to make payments."

Indeed, Judge

Boulden testified just the opposite:
Q.: You in testimony spoke about the funding
of plans and looking for regular income. Is
-56-

it possible to file a Chapter 13 proceeding
without at the time of filing having regular
income?
A.:
Wellf there is a legal issue as to
whether or not the original filing the debtor
has income at that time or whether its income
as of the confirmation of the plan. There is
a split of opinion regarding that.
Q.: Okay. If — for a hypothetical assuming
that a debtor knew he was going to work next
week, had a guaranteed job, would it be
possible to file a 13 based on that prospective income?
A.: Well, it's often done and there may be
other parties who pay the Chapter 13 payment
even.
Q.: Have you seen plans confirmed where they
were
initially
filed
on
a
prospective
[income] basis?
A.:

Yes.

(Tr. 690, lines 13-25, page 691, lines 1-4).
testimony,

the Panel

explicitly

announced

In the face of this
during

that it could not sanction Calder on this issue.

its

It recognized

that:
There are two areas where the Panel was not
convinced by the appropriate standard that in
fact there were problems. One of those was
the filings for Mr. Job of a Chapter 13. The
allegation of the Bar being that there was no
source of income by which one could appropriately make that kind of a filing. There was
some testimony that there could be a prospective income.
The Panel was just not convinced that that was, by the appropriate
standard, improper.
-57-

decision

(Tr. 1061).

Accordingly, the Panel's inclusion of Finding No.

2(d)(2) was improper.
Finally, there is no evidence in the record supporting
the Panel's

finding

that Calder

failed

to

inform Job that

he

would not obtain a discharge under his Chapter 13 case until he
had successfully completed all payments under the plan.
over, this finding

is completely

More-

irrelevant to any evidence in

the record because the bankruptcy court's ultimate decision to
dismiss the Chapter 13 case was in no way predicated on Job's
inability

to

complete

all

required

payments;

rather,

predicated on the fact that Job failed and refused —
concerns and objections of Calder —

it

was

over the

to attend the first meeting

of creditors (Tr. 506, 703).
17.

Finding No. 2(e);

[Calder] withdrew from representing Mr. Job
in July 1984, without Mr. Job's consent and
knowledge.
At the time of his withdrawal
[Calder] knew that it would be difficult for
Mr. Job to obtain substitute counsel to
resist the Chapter 13 Trustee's pending
motion for dismissal.
More than any other of the Panel's determinations, this finding
so grossly mischaracterizes the underlying evidence as to call
into question the competence of the Panel.
the

Bar's

prosecutor,

Job

initially

Under questioning by
that

Calder's

motion to withdraw was dated July 3, 1984 (Tr. 161).

At that
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testified

point, the prosecutor leadingly asked "Isn't it the 31st day of
July?" id.

In response

to

testimony by stating "Yes.

that

suggestion,

31st day.

Job

Excuse me.

whether the last one is a one or what it is."

id.

changed

his

I can't tell
Then, appar-

ently recognizing that the date reflected on the mailing certificate was actually July 3, the Bar's prosecutor stated "It does
state —
Id.

the mailing certificate

indicates it's dated July 3."

Obviously confused by this point, Job then opines

"All I

know is that it says July 30, 1984 and it was mailed that day, I
guess."

(Ijd.)

This is the only "evidence" in the record that

Calder's motion to withdraw was mailed on any date after July 3,
1984.

The evidence that it was actually mailed on July 3, 1984

is overwhelming:
Q.:
When did you become aware of the fact
that Mr. Calder desired to withdraw from your
case, then?
A.:
I don't know whether it was this document [the motion to withdraw] or whether it
was —
I really don't know.
I must have
received it in the mail, but I am just not
familiar with the document.
I see what it
says there. I see what I had —
Q.: Was that your address at the time, 4046
West Lake —
A.:

Yes, it was.

Q.: And the mailing on that is on the 3rd of
July; is that correct?
A.:

Yes.
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(Tr. 238).
Q.:
Did he tell you prior to that [the
trustee's motion to dismiss the Chapter 13
case] that he was going to withdraw?
A.: No f he did not.
in the mail.

He just —

I got that

Q.: When was the first time you found out he
was withdrawing as your lawyer?
A.:
I don't know.
I really can't remember
the dates, Mr. Leta.
I know the dates are
there, but I can't remember the exact dates.
(Tr. 160).
Q.: Okay.
Now had you made a determination
about whether or not you were going to
continue to represent Mr. Job at that time?
A.: I can't remember the exact precise date
when I decided, but I remember sitting down
thinking for about an hour and a half and
decided — that I did not want to represent
him because he would not do what I told him
to do, so I filed that Motion dated July 3rd
and the hearing was set for August 6th.
Q.: Okay.
Did you circulate the motion on
Mr. Job and Ms. Boulden?
A.:

Yes, I did.

Q.:

The motion to withdraw?

A.:

Yes, I did.

Q.: Was he —
by the Judge?

were you allowed to withdraw

A.: Yes. Judge Allen allowed me to withdraw
because he [Job] wouldn't do what I told him
to do.
-60-

(Tr. 508-9).
Therefore,

the

record

clearly

establishes

that

Job

received Calderfs motion to withdraw at least one month before
the scheduled

hearing

Chapter 13 petition.

on

the

trustee's motion

to dismiss

the

Notably, at the August 8, 1984 hearing on

whether that petition should be dismissed, Job's trustee vividly
recalls that Job consented to that action.
" ...

The court

inquired

if that's what he wanted done and he [Job] said, 'Yes.'"

(Tr. 634).
Finally, there is no evidence to support the Finding
that Calder knew that
substitute counsel.
its entirety.
18.

it would be difficult

for Job to obtain

Therefore, this Finding must be vacated in

13
Finding No. 2(g);

On or about August 8, 1984, the Chapter 13
was dismissed and the Chapter 7 vacated, with
a result that Mr. Job did not obtain any
relief
under
any
Bankruptcy
Chapter.
(Emphasis added.)
This Finding is misleading insofar as it states that Job obtained
no

relief

under

any

bankruptcy

chapter.

For

it

completely

ignores the obvious fact that during the time period the Chapter

"
For that reason, Finding No. 2(f) to the effect that Calder
made no effort to assist Job in obtaining substitute counsel is
similarly without merit.
-61-

7

petition

was

in

undeniably obtained

effect—October
relief.

1983

to

August

1984—Job

This Finding's suggestion that he

did not is clearly erroneous.
19.

Finding No. 2(h):

Thereafter, unable to afford new bankruptcy
counsel, Mr. Job filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pro se, in an attempt to prevent
foreclosure proceedings on the Jobs1 home;
the Chapter 11 filing was late and the home
was lost.
This Finding is clearly erroneous insofar as it seeks to impose
on Calder responsibility

for the loss of the Jobs' home.

The

record reflects that after engaging new counsel, Job was informed
by that counsel on the very morning of the trustee's sale that
the Chapter

11 petition

would

not

be

filed

certain additional attorneys' fees were paid.
was unable to timely pay the quoted fees.

Id.

unless

and

(Tr. 169).

until
Job

As a result, his

Chapter 11 petition was filed several minutes after the trustee's
sale was conducted.

(Tr. 169-70).

Mr. Job's testimony could not

be clearer:
Q.:
Did you attempt to retain counsel
file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition]?
A.:

Yes, I did.

Q.:

Did you have any luck?

A.:
I
Brown.
Chapter
come to

[to

talked to an attorney, Mr. Charles
Mr. Brown said that he would file a
11 bankruptcy for me and told me to
his office at a certain date. It was
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the date that the filing had to be done. It
was something like ten in the morning or
eleven in the morning — ten something in the
morning and when I got to Mr, Brown's office,
Mr. Brown said that he decided that I would
have to have $300 to $500 before he would go
ahead and take the bankruptcy onf but he said
that he would prepare the initial papers that
I would need at that time to file a Chapter
II bankruptcy.
But, by the time Mr. Brown
got the papers ready, and they weren't ready
when I got there in the morning — I had to
go to the bank and cash a check that I was to
give Mr. Brown.
By that time I was a certain amount of
minutes
late
in filing
the
bankruptcy,
because they were going to have a sale on our
home.
(Tr. 169).
Therefore

the Panel's

effort

to attribute

responsibility for the loss of Job's home —
month

after

Calder

withdrew

as

Job's

to

Calder

a loss that occurred

counsel

—

is

clearly

erroneous.
20.

Finding No. 2(i);

At no time after July 1984, did [Calder] seek
to amend his 1984 personal Chapter 13 case to
list Job as a creditor even though he knew
Job had claims against him for malpractice
and had filed a lawsuit on September 11, 1984
in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil
No. C84-5436, asserting such claims.
Calder admitted at the Bar trial that he never amended his 1984
personal Chapter 13 case to list Job as a creditor.
direct

evidence

regarding

the

reason

-63-

for

that

The only

failure

was

Calder's testimony that he mistakenly thought

that Job's claim

constituted a post-petition debt which could not be discharged in
bankruptcy.

(Tr. 442-45f 512, 779-81)•

Accordingly, Calder refrained from informing the state
court of the imposition of
1986.

the automatic stay until

February,

The Finding, however, fails to address the obvious issue

of why a debtor operating under a confirmed plan would have any
incentive not to disclose the existence of all creditors of which
he was aware, since that failure would preclude the debtor from
obtaining any relief from the debt owed to the creditor.
21.

Finding No. 2(k):

On or about July 16, 1985, at a time Mr. Job
was moving for Summary Judgment
in the
pending malpractice action, [Calder] filed a
Motion to Reopen Job's Chapter 11 proceeding,
solely with the intent to harass, injure and
annoy Mr. Job; no valid basis existed for
filing the motion and the motion asserted
matters upon which [Calder] had no basis to
make such allegations; in that
respect,
[Calder] knowingly and intentionally made the
following false or misleading statements:
(1) That he was a creditor of Job when, in
fact, he had never submitted a bill, previously demanded payment, or counterclaimed in
the civil action for the payment of any
attorney's fees;
(2) That the Jobs had intentionally omitted
creditors from their Chapter 11 case when, in
fact, [Calder] knew that the claims of such
creditors were contingent and disputed by the
debtors;
-64-

(3) That the Jobs had omitted a debt to a
family member in the amount of $35,000 when,
in factf [Calder] had no reasonable basis for
asserting such omission1
(4) That the debtor's Chapter 7 schedules
filed in 1983 had shown a gross income in
1982 of $30,000 when, in fact, the income had
been earned in 1981; and
(5) That the Jobs had omitted a substantial
claim to the Internal Revenue Service in the
amount of $5,00Q-$1Q,000 when,
in fact,
[Calder] had no reasonable basis for making
this assertion.
The difficulty with this Finding is that it ignores any mention
of the justification
affidavit:
court

advanced by Calder

To discharge his obligation

to

inform

the

court

that

false

for the filing of the
as an officer
or

otherwise

of

the

improper

disclosures were being made by a debtor seeking its protection,
(Tr. 450).
the

Had Calder failed to bring the issues contained in

affidavit

to

the

attention

of

the

court,

he

arguably violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

would

have

The Panel's

obvious insensitivity to Calder's reason for filing the affidavit
and its failure to appreciate the ethical mandates imposed upon
Calder to take the action he did, requires that this Finding be
vacated and remanded to the Panel with instructions to rewrite it
with proper reference to these issues.
22.

Finding No. 2(m);

In connection with the civil action entitled
Job v. Calder, Civil No. C84-5436, filed in
-65-

the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, [Calder] filed an
affidavit on about July 18, 1985 wherein
[Calder] knowingly and intentionally made the
following misstatements and accusations:
(1) That
Job
was
responsible
for
failing to list the lawsuit in his schedules
when, in fact, [Calder] admits that Job
signed the schedules the lawsuit was listed
as an asset.
Although Calder implies in the affidavit that Job was responsible
for

failing

schedules,

to

list

Calder

the

also

Job's position that Job

Pocklington

frankly

acknowledged

in
in

his

bankruptcy

the

affidavit

. . . signed a copy [of the schedules]

that contained the lawsuit."
and 9; R. 1613-16).

Case

(Trial Ex. B-50, paragraphs

1,2,6

Because Calder acknowledged that fact in the

affidavit,

the

Finding's

impeached

himself

during

apparent
the bar

implication

trial

by

that

admitting

Calder
that

the

lawsuit was listed as an asset unfairly portrays Calder1s role in
preparing the affidavit.

As such, the Finding is clearly errone-

ous.
Finding No. 2(m) further provides:
(2) That there was "some reason to
think that the debtor may have stolen a key
from the attorney's desk drawer while he was
alone in the office and entered the office at
night and effected certain changes [ s i c ]
original document that was to be filed with
the court" when, in fact, [Calder] had no
facts upon which to base this accusation.
[Calder] also stated: "Another theory is Mr.
Job had access to [Calder's] office and
-66-

perpetrated a fraud upon everybody by substituting a false paper in the papers to be
filed with the Court."
While it is admittedly irresponsible to set forth in an affidavit
speculative musings as to what may or may not have happened in a
transaction, it is equally clear that under the applicable rules
of civil procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), speculation cannot
be relied upon by the Court to establish or resolve a genuinely
disputed

material

undoubtedly

issue

attached

of
the

fact.
weight

As

such,

the

trial

court

to

such

appropriate

speculation—zero.
Perhaps

most

importantly,

because

Calder

frankly

couched his hypotheses in terms of speculation, and not in terms
of absolute fact, there is no way he can be found to have knowingly and intentionally made misstatements of fact, as suggested
by this Finding.

The law is settled that " . . .

the alleged

false statement must be a statement of fact and not a conclusion,
opinion or deduction drawn from given facts.
sion, opinion or deduction

is erroneous, or

That the concluis not

a correct

construction or a logical deduction from the facts cannot constitute a false swearing."
N.E. 2d 1,3 (1974).

People v. White, 59 111. 2d 416, 322

Accord, 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Perjury, § 8 (1972).

For this reason alone, the Panel's reliance on the speculative
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statements in the affidavit is misplaced.

The Finding on which

it is based must be vacated.
23.

Finding No. 2(n):

The Panel finds those defenses, accusations
and insinuations made by [Calder] against Job
to be spurious and indicative of an attitude
of bad
faith which
pervades
[Calder1s]
conduct in connection with the Utah State Bar
disciplinary
proceedings
and
the
court
proceedings.
It

is clearly

character

improper

of Calder1s

for

the Panel

conduct

from

to generalize

a specific

factual

regarding a discreet transaction or occurrence.
cannot

be permitted

to paint

with

such

about

a broad

the

finding

The Bar simply
brush.

This

gratuitous Finding must be stricken.
24.

Finding No. 2(o):

After Judge Frederick orally rendered his
judgment in the Job malpractice action in
favor of Mr. Jobf and before the formal
judgment was entered on February 24, 1986,
[Calder] transferred a substantial portion of
his properties to his wife and brother. Such
transfers are the subject of pending adversary proceedings by [Calder1s] Chapter 7
trustee to set aside such transfers as
fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy
Code.
Wholly

aside

from

the

glaring

absence

in

the

record

of

any

evidence remotely hinting at the value of the assets allegedly
transferred to his wife and brother, this finding isf by definition, preliminary and tentative in that it acknowledges that the
-68-

transfers are the subject of pending adversary proceedings.

The

fact that Calderfs trustee has failed to obtain a resolution of
the cases in the three years now available to him speaks loud and
clear about the merits of his case and his ability to have the
transfers declared fraudulent.

Unless and until the litigation

is resolved, the Panel should be precluded from using the mere
pendency

of

the

suits

as

even

a partial

basis

for

Calderfs

disbarment.
25.

Finding No. 3:

[Calder] filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding in 1986 in bad faith and it was
dismissed by the ruling of Judge Allen made
on May 12, 1986, which ruling is now final
and non-appealable.
[Calder] did not file
his 1986 Chapter 13 case until March 12, 1986
after entry of the judgment in favor of Job
in the civil case and after [Calder] failed
to post a supersedes bond to stay enforcement
of the judgment during the pendency of his
appeal.
[Calder1s] interest in filing the
Chapter 13 also was to frustrate the claims
of Job and Bailey.
This Finding
the Finding

is clearly erroneous for several reasons.
purports

dated May 12f 1986.

to

rely

upon Judge

Allen1s

bench

First,
ruling

While a copy of the ruling was introduced

into evidence as Trial Ex. B-37, the Bar's prosecutor failed to
adduce any copy of the underlying evidentiary hearing on which
Judge Allen made his decision.

This omission runs afoul of In Re

Strong supra, 616 P.2d at 583.
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Next, there is no evidence in the record that Calder!s
intent

in filing the Chapter

claims

of

Job

and

13 was

Bailey."

" . . .

In purporting

to frustrate the
to determine

that

intent, the Panel ignored Calderfs explanation that his purpose
for filing his 1984 petition was to save his house from an IRS
sale and his purpose for filing the 1986 petition was to keep the
assets of his law practice from being levied upon and dismembered
by Job to the ultimate detriment of Calder and his other creditors.

(Tr. 653, 734, 740-41).
Finally, the Finding fails to reflect that in November,

1988, Calder posted

a cash

supersedeas

$55,000 to fully satisfy Job's judgment

bond

in the

amount

(Tr. 790, 793-94).

of
It

also fails to reflect that Bailey's state court claim was dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action (Tr. 7 ) .
26.

Finding No. 4:

When [Calder] filed his statement of affairs
in his 1986 Chapter 7 case, he knowingly and
intentionally filed a statement for a debtor
"not engaged in business" when, in fact,
[Calder] knew, at such time, that he was
engaged in business.
While

Calder

admitted

at

the

Bar

trial

that

he

utilized

a

preprinted form statement for a debtor "not engaged in business"
despite

the

fact

that

he

was

engaged

in

business,

Calder! s

trustee in bankruptcy acknowledged that he (the trustee) was not
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prejudiced or confused in any way by Calderfs use of the technically incorrect form since the substance of required disclosure
in both forms are substantially identical (Tr. 598).
27.

14

Finding No. 5:

[Calder] also filed in 1986 a Chapter 7
bankruptcy action wherein the assets listed
are substantially less than those assets
listed in either [Calder's] 1984 or 1986
Chapter 13 schedules.
[Calder] had not made
any significant transfers of assets between
the filing of his 1986 Chapter 13 and his
1986 Chapter 7.
This

finding

highlights

Calder by the Bar's

the

failure

enormous
to set

prejudice

forth

imposed

even generally,

upon
let

alone with particularity, the facts alleged to constitute fraudulent misconduct.

For the finding neglects to identify even one

specific asset or any dollar amount for any asset deemed to have
been fraudulently concealed.

Moreover, even if Calder is forced

into the untenable position of seeking to prove a negative i.e.
that he did not conceal assets that the Bar has failed to identify, a careful
Bar's Finding.
The Finding

review of his bankruptcy

schedules belies the

(Compare Trial Exs. B-30, B-31, B-32 and B-33).

also

ignores

the fact

14

that many of

the so-called

Moreover, the bankruptcy statements of affairs (as distinguished from the bankruptcy schedules) are identical for debtors
engaged in business and debtors not engaged in business.
(Tr.
373-74).
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discrepancies

were

being reflected

attributable

Calder's

wife's

interests

in the 1984 filing and only his interest being

reflected in the 1986 filing.
28.

to

(Tr. 394, 515).

Finding No. 6;

[Calder] was denied a general discharge in
his Chapter 7 case by the Memorandum Decision
of Judge Allen entered on or about September
27, 1988f wherein the court found, by clear
and convincing
evidence, that
[Calder's]
failure to list assets in his Chapter 7
bankruptcy was 'knowing and fraudulent'.
Just

like

the

other

Findings

rubber

stamping

another

court's

rulings on the basis of mere introduction of the written ruling,
this

Finding

is devoid

underlying the ruling.

of

any

of

the

evidentiary

predicates

For this reason, it ignores the lesson of

In Re Strong supra, 616 P.2d at 583 and must be vacated.
In addition, as noted

in Argument

I above, the Bar's

Complaints made no mention of the Bar's intent to impose sanctions

against

general

Calder

discharge

for

his

the

own

bankruptcy

Chapter

7

court's

case.

denial

Despite

of

a

Calder's

objection to the Panel's consideration of that issue, Tr. 179-83,
the Panel made a specific finding that " . . .
to

list

certain

'knowingly
evidence

and

assets

in his

fraudulently'."

of Calder's denial

Chapter

Calder's failure

7 bankruptcy

The Panel's decision

of discharge

"state of mind," see Tr. 182, cannot
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on the

was
to

done
admit

issue of

his

now be relied upon as a

substantive

basis

disbarment.

Nor

Calder's

appeal

Federal system.
29.

to
can

of

support
this

the

the

Panel's

finding

decision

be
is

recommendation

relied upon
progressing

so

of

long as

through

the

15
Finding No. 7:

By an order entered on or about November 18,
1988,
[Calder] was denied the right to
convert his Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13
case ' in order to prevent [an] abuse of the
bankruptcy process.'
The Bar's

intent

to make Calder's

1988 conduct

disiplinary

proceedings was never disclosed

Complaints.

(See Argument I above).

a part of the

in either of the

As such, this Finding must

be vacated in its entirety.
30.

Finding No. 8:

Considering the time frame of [Calder's]
several bankruptcies and the great disparity
in assets between filings and considering the
fact that [Calder1s] primary creditor in 1986
was Dennis Job with his malpractice judgment
of
approximately
$55,000
plus
interest,
[Calder] was engaged in either actual fraud
or an attempt to defraud creditors.
In

response

to

Calderfs

objections

to

this

Finding,

the

Bar

stated that the Finding was an "inference" drawn from Findings

15

Moreover, the Bar's apparent obsession with attacking Calder
for his conduct in his personal bankruptcies violates S 525(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code which prohibits governmental units from
revoking a debtor's license solely because the debtor sought
bankruptcy relief. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a).
-73-

No. 3, 5, 6 and 7.

Therefore, if the Court modifies any of those

Findings,

No. 8 must

Finding

be

correspondingly

vacated

or

modified.
31.

Finding No. 10:

[Calder] stipulated to a private reprimand in
1983 in a matter involving approximately 20
different client matters.
In response to Calderfs objection to this Finding, the Bar's
Counsel stated that Exhibit B-52 supported it.

However, even a

cursory review of that exhibit discloses that it stands for no
such thing.

In addition,

the only other piece of evidence

tending to support the Finding is Exhibit B-40 which is simply a
copy of

the complaint

on which

Exhibit B-52 was based.

the stipulation

reflected

in

Significantly, Calder objected to the

admission of Exhibit B-40 on several grounds:
(i)

As

mere

unsubstantiated

allegations,

the

complaint could not be received as evidence of the truth of the
allegations;
(ii) The attempted admission of the complaint was
foundationally deficient;
(iii)

The twenty prior complaints were beyond the

scope of issues framed by the Complaints at issue in this proceeding.

(R. 1066-70).
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Like every other objection Calder made in the proceeding, the Panel overruled it and allowed the introduction of the
complaint.

In doing so, it relieved the Bar's prosecutor of the

burden imposed on any other prosecutor to establish the underlying merits, if any, of the allegations of the complaint, instead
of relying upon a mere copy of the resulting stipulation.
C.

Summary.

The foregoing analysis of the Panel's Findings establishes that they are hopelessly, clearly erroneous.

To revert to

the vernacular, the Findings are in a very real sense akin to
cold

fusion; they presume

to create

legal consequences

excess of the evidence that went into them.

far in

Appellate correction

of the process is required to insure that the litigant, Calder,
is not professionally killed.
ARGUMENT V
THE PANEL IMPROPERLY FAILED TO CONSIDER OR
FIND ANY
MITIGATING
FACTORS DURING
THE
PENALTY PHASE OF THE PROCEEDING.
In its recommendation
absolutely no mitigating

of discipline, the Panel found

factors.

In reaching that determina-

tion, the Panel purported to consider each of the factors outlined
tions.

in S 9.2 of the ABA Standards for Imposing
(Recommendation

at 20.)

Lawyer Sanc-

However, that section relates

solely to aggravating circumstances to be considered in deciding
-75-

what sanction to impose.

It is § 9.32 of the ABA Standards that

sets forth mitigating factors.

Notably, the Board's recommenda-

tion is devoid of any indication that it even considered any of
those mitigating factors.

If it had, it could consider S 9.32(d)

which provides that a "timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct"

is a mitigating

factor relevant to fashioning a fair sanction.
In this case, the Panel should have, but failed,

to

consider the following evidence on this issue:
a)
to the Bar

The extraordinary and unsolicited offer by Calder
in 1983 to attempt

to resolve Bailey's first claim

despite the Board's conclusion that the claim was time barred;
b)

Calderfs posting of a cash supersedeas bond in the

amount of $55,000 to ensure the satisfaction of Job's judgment in
the event it is affirmed on appeal; and
c)

The tenuous nature of the Findings.

The Panel's inexplicable failure to properly apply (or,
perhaps,
control

even

to

consider)

its determination,

the

standards

which

it deemed

requires those determinations

vacated.
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to

to be

ARGUMENT VI
THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT IS
SO DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CONDUCT THAT IT
FOUND CONSTITUTED ETHICAL VIOLATIONS AS TO BE
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE.
Given

the almost

incredible

extent

to which

(i) the

Findings are unsupported by the evidence, (ii) the Recommendation
exceeds the scope of the Findings, and (iii) neither the Findings
nor

the

Recommendation

conform

to

the

Bar's

Complaints,

the

Recommendation must be rejected on the grounds that it is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing
modify

the

Findings

and

reasons, the court should vacate or
Conclusions

and

should

reject

Recommendat ion.
DATED this jT_

day of August, 1989.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER

<AA*^&C*

Jon^i T. Anderson
Attorney for Appellant
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BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING PANEL
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR
Hearing Panel:
Robert J. Stansfield, Chairman
Richard P. Makoff
Molly P. Sumner
In Re:
RICHARD J. CALDER
DOB: 6-14-30
Admitted: 11-5-59

1
•
i

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
RECOMMENDATION OF
DISCIPLINE

i
i

F-253 and F-274
(Consolidated)

This matter, having been previously consolidated by
Order dated October 4, 1988, came on for disciplinary trial
on November 14-15, 1988, December 2, 3 and 20, 1988, and
January 23, 1989, before a Disciplinary Hearing Panel of
the Utah State Bar comprised of Robert J. Stansfield,
Chair, Richard P. Makoff, and Molly Sumner*

Special Bar

Counsel, David E. Leta, Esq., appeared on behalf of the
Utah State Bar and Richard J. Calder appeared in person and
through counsel, Daniel R. Boone, Esq.

The Panel having

taken testimony and having admitted Exhibits R-l and
B1-B52, as shown by the record, and having heard argument
of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, makes its Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendation as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT - 1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Panel makes the following findings, based upon

clear and convincing evidence in the record, with respect
to F-274f involving Larry Bailey.
a.

Mr. Bailey originally retained Respondent to

file a bankruptcy in 1978. Problems arose in this
bankruptcy respecting the discharge of a certain
judgment debt which precluded Mr. Bailey from
obtaining a Utah driver's license.
b.

In or about October 1983, Respondent entered

into an engagement with Mr. Bailey# arranged through

Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti, to resolve

an

investigation of a disciplinary complaint filed by Mr.
Bailey against Respondent. By this engagement,
Respondent agreed that he would obtain an amendment to
Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy schedules and obtain a
discharge for Mr. Bailey of a judgment debt owed by
Mr. Bailey to Richard D. and Morren C. Harris in the
sum of about $1,400.00.
c.

Respondent agreed to complete the engagement

and achieve the objective upon Mr. Bailey's paying
$10.00 for additional attorney's fees; Mr. Bailey made
said payment of $10.00 to Respondent.
d.

After accepting the engagement and agreeing

upon the fee to be charged, Respondent demanded
additional money from Mr. Bailey, in the amount of

FTXjn-NGS OF FACT -
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$120.00, in order to initiate the engagement.

Mr.

Bailey complained to Mr. Paelotti about this
additional fee.
e.

Subsequent to the October 1983 engagement,

numerous communications were exchanged between Mr.
Bailey and Respondent, and between Respondent and Bar
Counsel which concluded with Respondent reaffirming
his agreement to continue representing Mr. Bailey in
amending the bankruptcy schedules. Mr. Bailey paid an
additional $15.00 to Respondent, at Respondent's
request, in furtherance of the engagement.
f.

After reaffirming the engagement, Respondent

filed documents with the Bankruptcy Court on behalf of
Mr. Bailey as Mr. Bailey's counsel.
g.

Though Respondent presented conflicting

evidence as to the agreement, the Panel accepted
former Bar Counsel C. Jeffrey Paelotti's testimony as
the most credible evidence of Respondent's agreement
to represent Mr. Bailey in amending his Bankruptcy.
h.

Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen Mr.

Bailey's case, but the Motion was inadequate on its
face.
i.

After filing the Motion with the Bankruptcy

Court, Respondent failed to follow through with his
representation of Mr. Bailey by failing to schedule

the Motion to Reopen for hearing and by failing to
present the Motion to the judge for consideration.
j.

The Motion to Reopen was denied, and,

immediately upon learning of the Court's order,
Respondent withdrew from representing Mr. Bailey.

At

no time after February 16, 1984, did Respondent make
any effort to obtain substitute counsel for Bailey,
return the $10.00 paid by Bailey, refund any portion
of the original attorney's fees and costs paid by
Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps with the
Department of Motor Vehicles to assist Bailey obtain a
driver's license or, in any other way, assist Bailey
in achieving the desired objective.
k.

On or about April 16, 1984, Respondent, being

under oath, prepared, signed and filed an affidavit in
the case of Bailey v. Calder, Civil No. C85-800, then
pending in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Respondent
knowingly and intentionally made the following
misrepresentations and false statements:
1)

That after Judge Mabey had originally

granted an application to reopen Mr. Bailey's
case, the client was "to pay a $60.00 filing fee
to the court and also a $10.00 fee to add the
creditor that he had omitted, when, in fact,

^•MnTvr.c nT
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there was no such financial arrangement at that
time;
2)

That after 1979, Respondent had not had

any contact with Bailey until 1982 when, in fact
Bailey had contacted Respondent on several
occasions prior to that date;
3)

That Respondent did not represent Bailey

as his attorney in 1982 inasmuch as Bailey had
refused to pay anything to Respondent as
requested, when, in fact, Respondent had written
to Bailey in 1982 advising Bailey that Respondent
was proceeding with his case;
4)

That he had agreed to help Mr. Bailey in

1983 at the request of the Utah State Bar but
that nothing more was done because Bailey refused
to pay money when, in fact, Bailey had paid, in
full, all the money requested pursuant to the
agreement;
5)

That in 1983 he was not representing Mr.

Bailey because Bailey had not paid his retainer
fee and had "paid no money to [him]" when, in
fact, Bailey had paid all fees required under the
agreement; and
6)

That at no time after 1978 had

Respondent represented Bailey in any bankruptcy
matters, when, in fact, he had represented

FINDINGS OF FACT - 5

Bailey, had advised Bailey ahpnt- Kankrupt-ry
matters, and had filed motions for Bailey as

xflS19yLi
Bailey's attorney both iy
1979/and in 1984.
1.

In submitting the above-mentioned affidavit,

Respondent knew that the affidavit was submitted under
oath and that it would be relied upon by a judge in
adjudicating a legal matter pending before the court.
m.

When Respondent filed a personal Chapter 13

on February 23, 1984, he did not list Bailey as a
creditor even though, at that time, Respondent knew
that he was required to list all Icnown and contingent
liabilities and also knew that Bailey probably had a
claim against him for his failure to comply with the
terms of his agreement to^achieve the desired
objective.

Respondent did not seek to amend his 1984

Chapter 13 to add Bailey as a creditor until January
31, 1986 even though, as early as February 1985
Respondent knew that Bailey had filed a malpractice
action against him in the Third Judicial District
Court, Civil No. C85-800.
n.

Respondent did not attempt to give Mr. Bailey

notice of his 1984 Chapter 13 bankruptcy at any time
until after January 31, 1986.
o.

Respondent's 1984 Chapter 13 case was

dismissed by Judge Allen's on July 31, 1986, as having
been filed in bad faith. The court's order of

FINDINGS OF FACT - 6

dismissal is final and non-appealable.

No credible

evidence was presented to indicate that the dismissal
of Respondent's 1984 Chapter 13 was for reasons other
than that it was filed in bad faith or that the
Bankruptcy Court had any reason to dismiss the case
other than on the merits as set forth in Judge Allen's
ruling of July 30, 1986.
p.

Mr. Bailey was unable to obtain employment

for a substantial period of time due to his inability
—

— — — — — • •

m mm

~ —**

to obtain a driver's license.
2.

The Panel made the following findings, based on

clear and convincing evidence in the record, with respect
to F-253 involving Dennis Job.
a.

In or about October 1983, Dennis and Reta Job

retained Respondent to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on
their behalf.
b.

At the time Respondent agreed to file a

Chapter 7 case for Mr. and Mrs. Job, Respondent knew
that (1) Mr. Job was a plaintiff in a lawsuit,entitled
Job, et al. v. Pocklington, et al. which^was then
pending in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Civil No. C82-1085C, (2) Mr. Job
was seeking a substantial amount of money and damages,
in excess of $1,000,000 in such suit, (3) the cause of
action had to be listed as an asset in Job's Chapter 7
case, and (4) Job wanted the asset listed in his

FINDINGS OF FACT - 7

Chapter 7 case.

Nothwithstanding this knowledge,

Respondent did not take reasonable steps and
precautions to insure_jfchat this cause of action was
properly scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 case.
c.

At the time Respondent recommended that Job

file a Chapter 7, he did not discuss with Job the
option of filing under Chapter 13, and did not mention
any additional advantages which Job might realize if
he elected to proceed under Chapter 13.
d.

Subsequently, on or about April 27, 1984,

Respondent, rather than seeking to amend the Chapter 7
schedules, filed a Chapter 13 proceeding, for which
Mr. Job paid Respondent an additional $150.00, even
though, in giving this advice, Respondent knew, or
should have known, that:
1 ^-TReChapter 13 was likely to be
dismissed as a "bad faith filing" in light o\
Job's previous discharge under Chapter 7
2)

Job could not "save his home" under the^

Chapter 13 unless he had regular income with
fhich-to make
" ^

—

3)

The Chapter 13 would be ineffective

unless the previous discharge in the Chapter 7
were revoked or vacated; and

r» —\T^TXT/*C
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4)

Job would not obtain a discharge under

his Chapter 13 case until he had successfully
completed all payments under the plan.
e.

Respondent withdrew from representing Mr.^,Tnh

in July 1984, without Mr. Job's consent and knowledge.
At the time of his withdrawal Respondent knew that it
would be difficult for Mr. Job to obtain substitute
counsel to resist the^Chapter 13 trustee's pending
Motion for Dismissal.
f.

Respondent made no effort to assist Mr. Job

in obtaining substitute counsel to represent him in
the Chapter 13 proceeding.
g.

On or about August 8, 1984f the Chapter 13

was dismissed and the Chapter 7 vacatedf with the
result that Mr. Job did not obtain any relief under
either bankruptcy chapter.
h.

Thereafter, unable to afford new bankruptcy

counsel, Mr. Job filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pro
sef in an attempt to prevent foreclosure proceedings
on the Jobs' home; the Chapter 11 filing was late and
—

the home was lost.
i.

On or about September 11, 1984, Dennis and

Reta Job filed a malpractice action against Respondent
in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No.
C84-5436.

NGS OF FACT - 9

At no time after July 1984, did Respondent
seek to amend his 1984 personal Chapter 13 case to
list Job as a creditor even though he knew that Job
had claims against him for malpractice and had filed a
lawsuit on September 11, 1984 in the Third Judicial
District Court, Civil NO. C84-5436, asserting such
claims.
k.

On or about July 16, 1985, at a time Mr. Job

was moving for Summary Judgment in the pending
malpractice action, Respondent filed a Motion to
Reopen Job's Chapter 11 proceeding ./solel^ with the
intent to harass, injure and annoy Mr. Job; no valid
basis existed for filing the motion and the mo.tion
asserted matters upon which Respondent had no basis to
make such allegations; in that respect, Respondenr
knowingly and intentionally made the following false
or misleading statements:
(1) That he was a creditor of Job when, in
fact, he had never submitted a bill,
previously demanded payment, or
counterclaimed in the civil action for the
payment of any attorney's fees;
(2) That the Jobs had intentionally omitted
creditors from their Chapter 11 case when,
in fact, Respondent-knew that the claims of

rTxmrvcc rr
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such creditors were contingent and disputed
by the debtors;
(3)

That the Jobs had omitted a debt to a

family member in the amount of $35,000 when,
in fact, Respondent had no reasonable basis
for asserting such omission;
(4)

That the debtor's Chapter 7 schedules

filed in 1983 had shown a gross income in
1982 of $30,000 when, in fact, the income
had been earned in 1981; and
(5)

That the Jobs had omitted a substantial

claim to the Internal Revenue Service in the
amount of $5,000-$10,000 when, in fact,
Respondent had no reasonable basis for
making this assertion.
1.

At no time at or prior to filing his motion

to reopen, did Respondent file, or attempt to file, a
proof of claim in Job's Chapter 11 case.
m.

In connection with the civil action entitled

Job v. Calder, Civil No. C84-5436, filed in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, Respondent filed an Affidavit on or about July
18, 1985 wherein Respondent knowingly and
intentionally made the following misstatements and
accusations:

FINDINGS OF FACT - 11

1)

That Job was responsible for failing to

list the lawsuit in his schedules when, in fact.
Respondent admits that when Job signed the
schedules, the lawsuit was listed as an asset;
2)

That there was "some reason to think

that the debtor may have stolen a key from the
attorney's desk drawer while he was alone in the
office and entered the office at night and
effected certain changes [sic] original document
that was to be filed with the Court" when, in
fact, Respondent had no facts upon which to base
<

this accusation.

Respondent also stated:

"Another theory is Mr* Job had access to
defendant's office and perpetrated a fraud upon
everybody by substituting a false paper in the
papers to be filed with the Court"; and
3)

That, by insinuation and implication,

Job had tampered with the official files
maintained by the Bankruptcy Court when, in fact,
Respondent had no basis in fact to make any such
insinuation or accusation.
n.

The Panel finds those defenses, accusation,

and insinuations made by Respondent against Job to be
spurious and indicative of an attitude of^bad_faith
which pervades Respondent's conduct in connection with

FINDINGS OF FACT - 12

the Utah State Bar disciplinary proceedings(^ncL/-£he
court proceedings.
o.

After Judge Frederick orally rendered his

judgment in the Job malpractice action in favor of Mr.
Job, and before the formal judgment was entered on
February 24, 1986, Respondent transferred a
substantial portion of his property to his wife and
brother.

Such transfers are the subject of pending

adversary proceedings by Respondent's Chapter 7
trustee to set aside such transfers as fraudulent
transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.
3.

Respondent filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy

proceeding in 1986 in bad faith and it was dismissed by the
ruling of Judge Allen made on May 12, 1986, which ruling is
now final and non-appealable.

Respondent did not file his

1986 Chapter 13 case until March 12, 1986 after entry of
the judgment in favor of Job in the civil case and after
Respondent failed to post a supersedeas bond to stay
enforcement of the judgment during the pendency of his
appeal.

Respondent's interest in filing the Chapter 13

also was^jto frustrate the^claims of Job and Bailey.
4.

When Respondent filed his statement of affairs in

his 1986 Chapter 7 case, he knowingly and intentionally
filed a statement for a debtor "not engaged in business"
when, in fact, Respondent knew, at such time, that he was
engaged in business.

r'TiTnrtT^r
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5.^-RefependeifE" also filed in 1986 a Chapter 7
bankruptcy action wherein the assets listed are
substantially less than those assets listed in either
Respondent's 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules./ Respondent
had not made any significant transfers of assets between
the filing of his 1986 Chapter 13 and his 1986 Chapter 7.
6.

Respondent was denied a general discharge in his

Chapter 7 case by the Memorandum Decision of Judge Allen
entered on or about September 27r 1988, wherein the court
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent's
failure to list certain assets in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy
was "knowing and fraudulent."
7.

By an order entered on or about November 18, 1988,

Respondent was denied the right to convert his Chapter 7
case to a Chapter 13 case "in order to prevent [an] abuse
of the bankruptcy process."
8.

Considering the time frame of Respondent's several

bankruptcies and the great disparity ^n assets between
filings and considering the fact that Respondent's primary
creditor in 1986 was Dennis Job with his malpractice
judgment of approximately $55,000 + interest, Respondent
was engaged either in actual fraud or^aa^attempt to defraud
creditors.
9.

Though Respondent testified and presented defenses

to the charges of ethical violations, the Panel does not
find that testimony credible; Respondent had an excellent

nr\TnT\Tr^
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memory of details which served his purpose and failed to
remember any detail which might be construed against him;
further, when the production of certaiiy files )would have
been helpful to his defenses if they contained what he
represented, such files conveniently appeared to be lost or
unavailable,
c
>
10•

Respondent stipulated to a private reprimand in

1983 in a matter involving apjproximately 20 different
client matters.
11.

Mr. Job and Mr. Bailey retained Respondent

relying upon his substantial experience as a bankruptcy
attorney and relied on his advice in signing and submitting
documents in connection with their bankruptcy proceedings
and relied on Respondent to forthrightly and timely correct
any problem with their bankruptcies that may have arisen.
12.

At the outset, in handling the errors made in the

Bailey and Job bankruptcies, the corrections could have
been handled without a great expenditure of time or
resources on the part of Respondent; Respondent failed to
follow through on the steps he himself ultimately initiated
in assisting Mr. Job and Mr* Bailey.
Based on the foregoing Findings, the Panel makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

With respect to F-274, involving Larry Bailey, the

Panel concludes as follows:

FTMnrMr:^ or FAPT - i z

a.

Respondent had an attorney-client

relationship with Larry Bailey at various times from
1978 through at least 1983; Respondent's
representations in his affidavit filed in the Bailey
malpractice lawsuit as outlines in Finding K 1)
through 6) constitutes misrepresentations in violation
of Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
b7""~~~~"Respend*

u s personal

bankruptcy in 1984 and 1986 in an attempt to defeat
the claims of Mr. Bailey by filing false affidavits
constitutes dishonesty and fraud in violation of Canon
1, DR1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of jLhe. Utah^State Bar.
c. Respondent's filing of significantly disparate
schedules of assets in his personal Chapter 13
bankruptcy in 1986 and the 1986 Chapter 7 in such a
short time span constitutes dishonesty and fraud in
violation of Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(4) of the Revised
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
d.

Respondent's bad faith filing ofhi&~personal

bankruptcies inr 1984jand 1986, was for the primary
purpose of harassing and avoiding the claims of Mr*
Bailey, and constitutes conduct adversely reflecting
on his fitness to practice law in violation of Canon

rTxmTwr!c OTT T7Arrr -
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1, DR1-102(A) (6) of the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
e.

Respondent's initial failure to file a Motion

to Amend on behalf of Mr. Bailey as agree<Ljipoa__
between former Bar Counsel, Respondent an<a Mr. BaileV)
constitutes neglect of a legal matter in violation of
Canon 6, DR6-10KA) (3) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
f.

Respondent's failure to follow through with

the Motion to Amend once it was filed was knowing and
resulted in dismissal of the Motion and constitutes an
intentional failure to carry out a contract of
employment for professional services in violation of
Canon 7, DR7-10KA) (2) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
g.

Respondent's failure to notify Mr. Bailey of

the dismissal of his Motion to Amend combined with
Respondent's subsequent withdrawal of counsel without
notice^to Mr. Bailey resulted in harm to Mr. Bailey's
ability to have the Harris debt discharged and ability
to obtain a Utah driver's license and constitutes an
intentional prejudicing of a client's interests during
the course of a professional relationship in violation
of Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
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h.

Respondent's submission of a knowingly false

affidavit in the malpractice action styled Bailey v.
Calder constitutes conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice in violation of Canon 1,
DR1-102(A) (5) of the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
i.

Respondent's failure to timely notify Mr.

Bailey of his personal bankruptcy when he knew Mr.
Bailey was a potential creditor constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice in
violation of Canon lf DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Revised
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
2.

With respect to F-253, involving Dennis Job, the

Panel concludes as follows:
.a.

Respondent's failure to list Mr. Job's

Federal Court cause of action as an asset in the Jobs'
bankruptcy constitutes neglect of a legal matter in
violation of Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Revised
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
J&:""Respondent's filing of his personal
bankruptcies ill IjJfulnd 1986 was for the priimary
/purpose to harass or maliciously injure Mr. Job in
^3bigtit_of the ma1pra£ti£^action styled Job^y. Calder
and constitutes taking an action in representing
himself which Respondent knew would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another in violation of

Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(l) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar,
c.

Respondent's filing a Chapter 13 on behalf of

Mr. Job and then failing to respond to the Chapter 13
trustee's Motion for Dismissal, resulting in a
dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Job's Chapter 13
proceeding constitutes intentional prejudice and
damage to the client during the course of the
professional relationship in violation of Canon 7, DR
7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
d.

Respondent's withdrawal from representing Mr.

Job without notice to Mr. Job while the Chapter 13
*

..

^

•

trustee's Motion to Dismiss was pending constitutes
intentional prejudice to a client during the course of
a professional relationship in violation of Canon 7,
DR 7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional
Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
e.

Respondent's filing of his affidavit

containing false and spurious representations in the
malpractice action styled Job v. Calder constitutes
dishonesty, misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice in violation of Canon
1, DR 1-102(A)(4) and Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(5) of the
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah
State Bar.

f.

Respondent's filing the Motion to Reopen upon

a large number of Mr. Job's creditors in Job's Chapter
11 was without foundation or basis and constitutes
taking action merely intended to harass another and
conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to
practice law in violation of Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(1)
and Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) of the Revised Rules of
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar.
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the
Panel makes the following:
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
The Panel relied on the guidelines of the ABA in
determining a sanction, considering each of the factors
outlined in Section 9.2 of the ABA Standards for Imposing
**

<. " "L"n

- -

Lawyer Sanctions, particularly noting that aggravating and
mitigating circumstances may relate to the offenses at
issue, matters independent of the specific offense but
relevant to fitness to practice, or matters arising
incident to the disciplinary proceeding.
MITIGATION;
AGGRAVATION;
1.

Respondent has a prior disciplinary history

involving a stipulated private reprimand in 1983 entered
into to resolve approximately 20 separate client matters;
the Panel took into consideration the time period in which
the prior discipline was imposed.

2.

Respondent displayed a dishonest and selfish

motive in his attempts to cover his inappropriate handling
of both the Job and Bailey bankruptcies by filing several
personal bankruptcies in bad faith, filing false affidavits
in the malpractice actions filed by both Mr. Bailey and Mr.
Job, and by filing inappropriate asset schedules, and in
doing so perpetrated fraud, engaged in misrepresentations
and in misleading conduct with the courts and his clients.
3.

Respondent's actions display a(gattern of

misconduct that have exceeded a decade beginning with the
representation of Mr. Bailey in 1978 and the subsequent
representation of Mr. Job in 1983 and Mr. Bailey since
1983.
4.

Respondent has committed multiple disciplinary

offenses with respect to both Mr. Job and Mr. Bailey as
outlined in the Conclusions of Law and which taken together
constitute egregious misconduct.
5.

Respondent has failed to recognize that he has

engaged in any misconduct and displays a totalJLack of
remorse and has contradicted on many occasions his own
testimony in order to avoid any responsibility; that
attitude continued even after this Panel announced its
findings with respect to the disciplinary rules violated.
6.

The clients in this case were particularly

vulnerable since the assistance they sought was in a highly
specialized area of law in which Respondent purported to be

TTTXTT^TXT/'

one of the foremost experts, at least by implication in
that he claims

to file

more bankruptcy

cases

than

any

practitioner in the State.
7.

Respondent has substantial experience in the

practice of law, having filed thousands upon thousands of
matters in Bankruptcy Court and could have easily, and
without great expense, addressed his clients1 problems at
the outset but intentionally refused and failed to do so.
8.

Respondent has shown an indifference to making

restitution from the beginning when he could have handled
the clients' problems with relatively little consumption of
time and expense; he failed and refused to timely and
professionally act on those problems even when the concerns
were specifically addressed by the Bar and the clients.
Relying on the above factors, and the egregious nature
of the totality of the misconductf the Disciplinary Hearing
Panel hereby recommends that the Respondent be disbarred
from the practice of law in the State of Utah endythat
prior to any reinstatement the Respondent show that he has
satisfied the malpractice judgment obtained against him by
Mr. Job and that Respondent pay the costs incurred by the
Utah State Bar in prosecuting this action; said costs shall
be established by affidavit to be submitted by the Office
of Bar Counsel.

Dated this

ICw

daq of February, 1989.

THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING PANEL

A

ield, Chair

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact was hand delivered to Daniel R,
Boone, Esq-, 8 East 300 South, #735, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this

day of

A

1989.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

FORMAL COMPLAINT

In Re:
RICHARD CALDER
DOB: 11/04/32
Admitted: 09/05/74

No. F-274

The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in
this complaint is Richard Calder, who is an Attorney and
Counselor in the State of Utah, and a member of the Utah
State Bar, residing at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, and whose address, according to the
records of the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, is
2480 South Main Street #109, Salt Lake City, Utah

84115.

II
This Complaint is filed with the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned as
the regularly appointed Ethics and Discipline Committee of
the Utah State Bar.
Ill
The ethical violations and the factual basis in support
thereof are alleged as follows:

Ethical Allegations
1.

That Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR

1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar by engaging in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
2*

That Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR

1-102(A)(5) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar by engaging in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice; and/or
3.

That Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR

1-102(A)(6) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar by engaging in any other conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law; and
4.

That Richard Calder has violated Canon 6, DR

6-101(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar by handling a legal matter with
preparation adequate in the circumstances; or
5.

Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of

Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar by neglecting a
legal matter entrusted to him;
6.

That Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR

7-10KAH2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar by intentionally failing to carry out a
contract of employment for professional services;
7.

That Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR

7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of

the Utah State Bar by intentionally prejudicing or damaging
his client's interest during the course of the relationship.
Factual Allegations
1.

In October 1983 a complaint by Larry Bailey against

Respondent was dismissed as the statute of limitations
barred any action.
2.

Respondent indicated to the Screening Panel and Bar

Counsel Jeff Paoletti during the proceedings on that matter
that he would amend the bankruptcy schedules of Mr. Bailey
to include the names of creditors Richard D. and Morena C.
Harris in an amount of $1,399.00 and finally resolve the
bankruptcy that Respondent had filed on behalf of Mr. Bailey
in 1978. The only requirement was that Mr. Bailey pay
Respondent $10.00.
3.

Mr. Bailey paid $10.00 to Respondent in November

4.

In December 1983 Respondent notified Mr. Bailey by

1983.

letter that the Bankruptcy Court would require that his case
be reopened before the omitted debt could be added.
Respondent stated that there would be a $50.00 filing fee
and a $70.00 attorney fee.
5.

Mr. Bailey contacted Mr. Paoletti by telephone and

complained that Respondent was not keeping the agreement he
had made with the Bar.
6.

Respondent agreed to complete the work for only

$15.00 more.

7.

On December 29, 1983, Mr. Bailey paid the $15.00.

8.

In January 1984 Respondent filed a "Motion to

Reopen Chapter 7 to Add A-3 Claims".
9.

The court denied the motion without prejudice to

its renewal, because of the lack of specificity in the
motion, which did not name the specific creditors to be
added or give a basis for reopening the case.
10.

Immediately thereafter Respondent notified Mr.

Bailey by letter that he was returning $15.00 to him and
that he would not handle the case further.
11.

In an affidavit submitted by Respondent in Bailey

v. Calder, Civil No. C85-800, in The Third District Court,
dated April 16, 1985, Respondent falsely stated: "At no time
since 1978 have I represented Ernest L. Bailey in any
bankruptcy matters."
WHEREFORE, the undersigned, on behalf of the UTAH STATE
BAR prays that proceedings be taken herein against the
attorney charged pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar and that the Utah State Bar be awarded
its costs in bringing this action.
DATED

this , Q ^ day of /9<JK

Jd^Carol Nesset-Sale
Bar Counsel

, 1987.

Franklin L. Gunnell
Chairman, Ethics and
Discipline Committee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Formal Complaint and Summons was mailed certified
mail return receipt requested to Richard Calder, Attorney
at Law, 2480 South Main Street #109, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115 and to Daniel Boone, Attorney for Respondent, 8 East
0 SouthJT£35,
South J735, Salt LLake
i
300
City, Utah
of (Q/MtU^

1987.

84111 this ^(2/day
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR

IN RE:

J. RICHARD CALDER

1
i

AMENDED FORMAL
COMPLAINT

I

No. F-253

I
The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in
this complaint is J. Richard Calder, who is an Attorney and
Counselor in the State of Utah, and a member of the Utah
State Bar, residing at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt
Lake, in the State of Utah, and whose address, according to
the records

of the Executive Director of the Utah State

Bar, is 2480 South Main Street, #109, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115.
II
This complaint is filed with the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned as
the regularly appointed Ethics and Discipline Committee of
the Utah State Bar.
Ill
The unprofessional conduct charged in violation of the
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar
is alleged to be as follows, based upon allegations of fact
set forth below:

7,
4teV

1.

That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR

1-102(A)(4): engaging in conduct involving in dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
2.

That J. Richard Calder has violated DR 1-102(A)(6):

engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law;
3.

That J. Richard Calder has violated DR 1-102(A)(5):

engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice;
4.

That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 6, DR

6-101(A)(2): handling a legal matter without preparation
adequate in the circumstances;
5c

That J. Richard Calder has violated DR 6-101(A)(3):

neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him;
6.

That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR

7-101(A)(l): a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably
available means...;
7.

That J- Richard Calder has violated DR 7-101(A)(3):

a lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage his
client during the course of the professional relationship;
8.

That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR

7-102(A)(l): in his representation of a client, a lawyer
shall not file a suit, assert a position... or take other
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or
maliciously injure another;

9,

That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 9,:

avoiding the appearance of impropriety.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT;
a.

On January 9, 1986, Judge Frederick heard a case

entitled Dennis R, Job and Reta Job v. Richard Calder, Civil
No. C-84-5436 in the Third Judicial District Court.
b.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in that

case state that:
1.

In about October 1983 Plaintiffs retained

Defendant as their counsel to advise them regarding the
filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
2.

Plaintiffs informed Defendant that Dennis Job

owned stock and was plaintiff in a Federal District
Court lawsuit, Job v. Pocklington, et. al., C82-1085C.
3.

Defendant made a note of that lawsuit in his

working papers to be listed as an asset.
4.

Plaintiff signed schedules prepared by

Defendant that included that lawsuit as an asset.
5.

Plaintiffs Chapter 7 bankruptcy was filed on

October 13, 1983, No. 83C-02769.
6.

Defendant and/or his employee filed the

schedules with the bankruptcy court but the schedules
did not list the Federal District Court lawsuit or
ownership of stock as asset.
7.

The bankruptcy court entered a order of

discharge on January 9, 1984, noting "the above matter
has been closed as a *no asset1 case.

The Defendants

in the Federal District Court lawsuit learned that
Plaintiffs had filed the Chapter 7 bankruptcy and upon
checking the court files that the lawsuit and ownership
of stock were not listed as assets.
8.

On about April 13, 1984, Defendants moved to

reopen the Chapter 7 bankruptcy inferentially alleging
bankruptcy, fraud and perjury for failure to list the
assets.
9.

Plaintiffs finally contacted Defendant, told

him they were upset over his failure to list the
assets and the allegations of fraud and perjury
brought against them and asked him to oppose the motion
to reopen, to which the Defendant responded he would
take care of it.
10. Defendant failed to take appropriate
corrective action when it became known the omission
occurred.
11. Defendant determined, rather than seeking to
amend the Chapter 7 schedules, to file a Chapter 13
proceeding, for which Plaintiffs paid him an additional
$150.00.

The Chapter 13 proceeding was filed April 27,

1984.
12. Defendants1 expert witness, Judith Boulden,
the standing trustee for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
testified this procedure was an improper use of the
bankruptcy law.

13. Defendant omitted Plaintiffs' stock ownership
as an asset in the Chapter 13. Defendant also failed
to oppose the motion to reopen or express to the
bankruptcy court or Judith Boulden that the assets were
revealed to him by the Plaintiffs or that the omission
was his mistake.

Defendant admitted that he did not

think it was his duty to the Plaintiffs to acknowledge
his mistake.
14. Defendant alleged in his Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
that Plaintiffs' had stolen a key to his office and
tampered with the schedules, or substituted schedules
in the bankruptcy courts file.
15. On May 15r 1984, Defendant stated during the
hearing on the Motion to reopen, "Well, we don't oppose
reopening the case" and the Motion was granted.
16. On June 12, 1984, a Motion to continue the
Federal District Court lawsuit which had been filed
earlier was granted.

The grounds for that Motion were

that the lawsuit, upon reopening the Chapter 7, would
be in the control of the Chapter 7 trustee.
Subsequently, Plaintiffs attorney, Dennis Olsen, moved
to withdraw from that case on the grounds that the
lawsuit was not in control of the Chapter 7 trustee,
which motion was granted.

Plaintiffs expended

$3,600.00 in costs and fees in preparing their Federal
District Court lawsuit for trial.

17. On June 26, 1984, the standing trustee for the
Chapter 13 bankruptcy moved to dismiss Plaintiffs1
Chapter 13 with prejudice, or in the alternative, to
reconvert to a Chapter 7.

Defendant told Plaintiffs

that he would handle the trustee's Motion.

On July 3,

1984, Defendant moved to withdraw as counsel for
Plaintiffs.

On August 6, 1984, over Plaintiffs1

objection, the Motion to withdraw was granted, just two
days prior to the hearing on the trustee's Motion.
18. On August 8, 1984, a hearing was held on the
trustee's Motion, and the court ordered the discharge
previously granted under the Chapter 7 would be revoked
and

the Chapter 13 would be dismissed without

prejudice.
19. Plaintiffs were unable to afford new
bankruptcy counsel and filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
pro se in an attempt to prevent foreclosure proceedings
on their home.

Plaintiffs were thirty-three minutes

late in filing the chapter 11.

A Motion was brought to

determinate the automatic stay, which Motion was
granted, and Plaintiffs lost their home in which they
had lived for twenty-four years and had an equity in
the amount of $12,574.00.
20. Due to the emotional distress caused by the
foul up in their bankruptcy, the allegations of fraud
and perjury brought against them, the delay of the new
defenses in their Federal District Court lawsuit, and

the loss of their home, Plaintiffs' daughter was
obliged to move in with her sister, and subsequently
Plaintiffs were separated for over three months.
21. On about December 7, 1984, Plaintiffs settled
their Federal District Court lawsuit for $15,000.00 and
an Assignment of Rights, if any, that the Defendants in
said lawsuit may have in the $40,000.00 deposited with
the bankruptcy court, pursuant to a plan of
reorganization of Great Northern Baseball Corporation.
22. On July 16, 1985, just six days after
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in their lawsuit
against Defendant, Defendant moved to reopen
Plaintiffs1 Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Defendant alleged

in his Motion to reopen that he was a creditor of
Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs had committed
bankruptcy fraud and income tax evasion for failure to
report $30,000.00 in income.

Defendant's Motion to

reopen was summarily denied by the bankruptcy court.
23. The Federal District Court lawsuit, which was
worth $100,000.00, was diminished by 60% by reason of
the fact that Plaintiffs' attorney, John McDonald, was
told by Defendants' attorney that they would prepare a
defense to detect the credibility of Dennis Job based
upom his failure to list the lawsuit in the Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
C.

The Conclusions of Law in the case entitled Dennis

Job and Reta Job v. Richard Calder state that:

1.

Defendant's conduct was intentional, malicious,

without cause or basis in fact and in reckless disregard of
Plaintiffsf rights.
2.

Defendant's conduct represented an egregious

violation of his legal and ethical obligations to the
Plaintiffs.
3.

Defendant was negligent in omitting assets in the

schedules filed with the bankruptcy court.
4.

Defendant was negligent in failing to take

appropriate corrective action when it became known the
omissions of assets occurred.
5.

Defendant was negligent in failing to express to

the bankruptcy court or to the standing trustee that the
omission was his mistake.
6.

Defendant's conduct in withdrawing as counsel was

intentional and in reckless disregard of the rights of
Plaintiffs.
7.

Defendant's conduct in filing a Motion to Reopen

Plaintiffs' Chapter 11 bankruptcy was intentional,
malicious, and in reckless disregard of the rights of
Plaintiffs.
8.

Defendant's allegations were without any authority

or basis in fact and it was no coincidence that Defendant
filed said Motion just six days after Plaintiffs filed their
Motion for partial summary judgment.
9.

Plaintiffs were damaged and defendant is liable for

diminution in value of the lawsuit calculated as follows:

$100,000.00 less $55,000.00 received for net of $45,000.00,
diminution of which 60% was attributable to the conduct of
Defendant, which sura equals $27,000.00 minus $9,000.00 that
would have been paid from the recovery, leaving a net of
$18,000.00.
10. Plaintiffs were damaged and Defendant is liable for
$240.00 in fees and costs for the Chapter 7 proceeding,
$150.00 fees and costs for the Chapter 13 proceeding and
$3,600.00 fees and costs for preparing the Federal District
Court lawsuit for trial.
11. Plaintiffs were damaged and Defendant is liable for
$12,574.00 representing Plaintiffs' equity in their former
home.
12. Plaintiffs were damaged and Defendant is liable for
$10,000.00 general damages for emotional distress and
suffering inflicted by the reckless and/or intentional
conduct of the Defendant.
13. Defendant is liable for $10,000.00 general damages
for his malicious and intentional conduct, and is liable for
a total award of damages in the amount of $54,564.00.
d.

After the ruling of the court was rendered in Job

v. Richard Calder, but before the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were signed, Respondent, J. Richard
Calder, transferred some of his assets to his brother in
consideration of a loan.

Respondent also transferred

ownership in some of his property in Provo to his wife.
Respondent did not obtain approval from the bankruptcy court

to transfer those assets despite the fact that his 1984
bankruptcy was still open.
e.

One day before the Judgment was to be signed by

Judge Dennis Frederick, Respondent sent a notice to the
court stating that he had a 1984 bankruptcy which precluded
the entry of the Judgment.

Judge Dennis Frederick signed

the Judgment despite Respondent's 1984 bankruptcy.

Mr. and

Mrs. Jobfs attorney, Peter Waldo, was unaware of
Respondent's 1984 bankruptcy until Respondent filed the
above mentioned notice with the court.
f.

Peter Waldo then began executing on the Judgment.

After Respondent was served but before the Sheriff's Sale
was held, Respondent filed a 1986 bankruptcy.

Peter Waldo

filed a Motion to convert or dismiss or for relief from the
automatic stay on behalf of the Jobs.
g.
Motion.

On May 12, 1986, a hearing was held on Mr. Waldo's
Judge John H. Allen stated in his ruling, "I find

under all of the circumstances, each of the factors which
have been enumerated would not be sufficient in and of
itself, but the totality of these factors leave me to
conclude that the Chapter 13 proceeding, which was filed on
March 12, 1986, No. 86A-01032, was filed in bad faith.

This

bad faith is cause, under Section 1307(C) for dismissal.
find it would be in the best interest of creditors to
dismiss the case and deny relief from the stay, and the
court will order the case dismissed."

I

h.

Mr* Waldo filed a Motion to dismiss Respondent's

1984 bankruptcy*

On August 22, 1986, Judge John E. Allen

dismissed Respondent's 1984 bankruptcy for lack of good
faith.
i.

On August 19, 1986, Respondent filed a Chapter 7

bankruptcy.

The 1986 Chapter 7 bankruptcy matrix lists

approximately 900 of respondents clients as creditors.
During the Screening Panel meeting, Respondent indicated
that he was not sure whether or not he still represents the
clients that were listed on the bankruptcy matrix.
WHEREFORE, the undersigned, on behalf of the UTAH STATE
BAR prays that proceedings be taken herein against the
attorney charged pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline of
the Utah State Bar, and that restitution be provided to the
Complainants if a final order of the appropriate court(s)
affirms the judgment against Respondent and finds the
judgment non-dischargable in bankruptcy, should Respondent
challenge the judgment. The Utah State Bar also asks that
it be awarded its costs in bringing this action.

DATED this <?UX day of

OL

ffa^^-S^

Jo /iarol
/Jarol Nfesset-Sale
Nesset-Sale
Bar Counsel

Ov^j^

1987.

Franklin L. Gunnell
Chairman, Ethics and
Discipline Committee

